In certain cases, we check a file for write access before it has been
copied up to the top-level fs. We don't want to fail because the
bottom layer is read-only - of course it is - so skip that check in
those cases.
Thanks to Felix Fietkau <nbd@xxxxxxxxxxx> for a bug fix.
XXX - Document when to call union_permission() vs. inode_permission()
XXX - Kinda gross. Probably a simpler solution.
Signed-off-by: Valerie Aurora <vaurora@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/namei.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++----
fs/open.c | 8 ++++++--
fs/union.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
include/linux/union.h | 2 ++
5 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 61e94aa..a8d3acf 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -230,16 +230,17 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
}
/**
- * inode_permission - check for access rights to a given inode
+ * __inode_permission - check for access rights to a given inode
* @inode: inode to check permission on
* @mask: right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
+ * @rofs: check for read-only fs
*
* Used to check for read/write/execute permissions on an inode.
* We use "fsuid" for this, letting us set arbitrary permissions
* for filesystem access without changing the "normal" uids which
* are used for other things.
*/
-int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+int __inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, int rofs)
{
int retval;
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
/*
* Nobody gets write access to a read-only fs.
*/
- if (IS_RDONLY(inode) &&
+ if ((rofs & IS_RDONLY(inode)) &&
(S_ISREG(mode) || S_ISDIR(mode) || S_ISLNK(mode)))
return -EROFS;
@@ -277,6 +278,18 @@ int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
}
/**
+ * inode_permission - check for access rights to a given inode
+ * @inode: inode to check permission on
+ * @mask: right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
+ *
+ * This version pays attention to the MS_RDONLY flag on the fs.
+ */
+int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+ return __inode_permission(inode, mask, 1);
+}
+
+/**
* file_permission - check for additional access rights to a given file
* @file: file to check access rights for
* @mask: right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
@@ -2129,7 +2142,7 @@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
break;
}
- error = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode);
+ error = union_permission(path, acc_mode);
if (error)
return error;
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index dd98e80..3df5a1b 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/falloc.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+#include <linux/union.h>
int vfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)
{
@@ -333,6 +334,7 @@ static long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small)
error = security_path_truncate(&file->f_path, length,
ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME);
if (!error)
+ /* Already copied up for union, opened with write */
error = do_truncate(dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, file);
out_putf:
fput(file);
@@ -493,7 +495,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(faccessat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, int, mode)
goto out_path_release;
}
- res = inode_permission(inode, mode | MAY_ACCESS);
+ res = union_permission(&path, mode | MAY_ACCESS);
+
/* SuS v2 requires we report a read only fs too */
if (res || !(mode & S_IWOTH) || special_file(inode->i_mode))
goto out_path_release;
@@ -507,7 +510,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(faccessat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, int, mode)
* inherently racy and know that the fs may change
* state before we even see this result.
*/
- if (__mnt_is_readonly(path.mnt))
+ if ((!is_unionized(path.dentry, path.mnt) &&
+ (__mnt_is_readonly(path.mnt))))
res = -EROFS;
out_path_release:
diff --git a/fs/union.c b/fs/union.c
index d56b829..8d94b22 100644
--- a/fs/union.c
+++ b/fs/union.c
@@ -390,6 +390,30 @@ static int union_relookup_topmost(struct nameidata *nd, int flags)
return err;
}
+
+/**
+ * union_permission - check for access rights to a given inode
+ * @inode: inode to check permission on
+ * @mask: right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
+ *
+ * In a union mount, the top layer is always read-write and the bottom
+ * is always read-only. Ignore the read-only flag on the lower fs.
+ *
+ * Only need for certain activities, like checking to see if write
+ * access is ok.
+ */
+
+int union_permission(struct path *path, int mask)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+
+ if (!is_unionized(path->dentry, path->mnt))
+ return inode_permission(inode, mask);
+
+ /* Tell __inode_permission to ignore MS_RDONLY */
+ return __inode_permission(inode, mask, 0);
+}
+
/*
* union_create_topmost - create the topmost path component
* @nd: pointer to nameidata of the base directory
@@ -489,6 +513,9 @@ static int union_copy_file(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
if (IS_ERR(new_file))
goto fput_old;
+ /* XXX be smart by using a length param, which indicates max
+ * data we'll want (e.g., we are about to truncate to 0 or 10
+ * bytes or something */
size = i_size_read(old_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
if (((size_t)size != size) || ((ssize_t)size != size)) {
ret = -EFBIG;
@@ -516,7 +543,8 @@ static int union_copy_file(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct vfsmount *old_mnt,
* The topmost directory @new_nd must already be locked. Creates the topmost
* file if it doesn't exist yet.
*/
-int __union_copyup(struct path *old, struct nameidata *new_nd, struct path *new)
+int __union_copyup(struct path *old, struct nameidata *new_nd,
+ struct path *new)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
int error;
@@ -581,7 +609,7 @@ out_dput:
* @nd: nameidata pointer to the file
* @flags: flags given to open_namei
*/
-int union_copyup(struct nameidata *nd, int flags)
+int union_copyup(struct nameidata *nd, int flags /* XXX not used */)
{
struct qstr this;
char *name;
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 57690ab..38fb113 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2106,6 +2106,7 @@ extern void emergency_remount(void);
extern sector_t bmap(struct inode *, sector_t);
#endif
extern int notify_change(struct dentry *, struct iattr *);
+extern int __inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, int rofs);
extern int inode_permission(struct inode *, int);
extern int generic_permission(struct inode *, int,
int (*check_acl)(struct inode *, int));
diff --git a/include/linux/union.h b/include/linux/union.h
index a0656b3..92654e0 100644
--- a/include/linux/union.h
+++ b/include/linux/union.h
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ extern struct dentry *union_create_topmost(struct nameidata *, struct qstr *,
extern int __union_copyup(struct path *, struct nameidata *, struct path *);
extern int union_copyup(struct nameidata *, int);
extern int union_copyup_dir(struct path *path);
+extern int union_permission(struct path *, int);
#else /* CONFIG_UNION_MOUNT */
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ extern int union_copyup_dir(struct path *path);
#define __union_copyup(x, y, z) ({ BUG(); (0); })
#define union_copyup(x, y) ({ (0); })
#define union_copyup_dir(x) ({ BUG(); (0); })
+#define union_permission(x, y) inode_permission((x)->dentry->d_inode, y)
#endif /* CONFIG_UNION_MOUNT */
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
--
1.6.3.3
--
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