On 6/12/24 10:29, Paul Moore wrote:
On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 4:15 AM Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Tue, Jun 11, 2024 at 06:38:31PM GMT, Paul Moore wrote:
On Tue, Jun 11, 2024 at 6:15 PM Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
...
Arguably, if we do want fine-grained userns policies, we need LSMs to
influence the userns capset at some point.
One could always use, or develop, a LSM that offers additional
controls around exercising capabilities. There are currently four
in-tree LSMs, including the capabilities LSM, which supply a
security_capable() hook that is used by the capability-based access
controls in the kernel; all of these hook implementations work
together within the LSM framework and provide an additional level of
control/granularity beyond the existing capabilities.
Right, but the idea was to have a simple and easy way to reuse/trigger
as much of the commoncap one as possible from BPF. If we're saying we
need to reimplement and/or use a whole new framework, then there is
little value.
I can appreciate how allowing direct manipulation of capability bits
from a BPF LSM looks attractive, but my hope is that our discussion
here revealed that as you look deeper into making it work there are a
number of pitfalls which prevent this from being a safe option for
generalized systems.
TBH, I don't feel strongly about this, which is why it is absent from
v1. However, as John pointed out, we should at least be able to modify
the blob if we want flexible userns caps policies down the road.
As discussed in this thread, there are existing ways to provide fine
grained control over exercising capabilities that can be safely used
within the LSM framework. I don't want to speak to what John is
envisioning, but he should be aware of these mechanisms, and if I
recall he did voice a level of concern about the same worries I
mentioned.
sorry, I should have been more clear. I envision LSMs being able to
update their own state in the userns hook.
Basically the portion of the patch that removes const from the
userns hook.
An LSM updating the capset is worrysome for all the reasons you
pointed out, and I think a few more. I haven't had a chance to really
look at v2 yet, so I didn't want to speak directly on the bpf part of
the patch without first giving a good once over.
I'm happy to discuss ways in which we can adjust the LSM hooks/layer
to support different approaches to capability controls, but one LSM
directly manipulating the state of another is going to be a no vote
from me.
I might not be as hard no as Paul here, I am always willing to listen
to arguments, but it would have to be a really good argument to
modify the capset, when there are multiple LSMs in play on a system.
