On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 08:49:12AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: > On Thu, 30 May 2024 at 03:32, Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > Ofc depends on whether Linus still agrees that removing this might be > > something we could try. > > I _definitely_ do not want to see any more complex deny_write_access(). > > So yes, if people have good reasons to override the inode write > access, I'd rather remove it entirely than make it some eldritch > horror that is even worse than what we have now. > > It would obviously have to be tested in case some odd case actually > depends on the ETXTBSY semantics, since we *have* supported it for a > long time. But iirc nobody even noticed when we removed it from > shared libraries, so... > > That said, verity seems to depend on it as a way to do the > "enable_verity()" atomically with no concurrent writes, and I see some > i_writecount noise in the integrity code too. > > But maybe that's just a belt-and-suspenders thing? > > Because if execve() no longer does it, I think we should just remove > that i_writecount thing entirely. deny_write_access() is being used from kernel_read_file() which has a few wrappers around it and they are used in various places: (1) kernel_read_file() based helpers: (1.1) kernel_read_file_from_path() (1.2) kernel_read_file_from_path_initns() (1.3) kernel_read_file_from_fd() (2) kernel_read_file() users: (2.1) kernel/module/main.c:init_module_from_file() (2.2) security/loadpin/loadpin.c:read_trusted_verity_root_digests() (3) kernel_read_file_from_path() users: (3.1) security/integrity/digsig.c:integrity_load_x509() (3.2) security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c:ima_read_busy() (4) kernel_read_file_from_path_initns() users: (4.1) drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c:fw_get_filesystem_firmware() (5) kernel_read_file_from_fd() users: (5.1) kernel/kexec_file.c:kimage_file_prepare_segments() In order to remove i_writecount completely we would need to do this in multiple steps as some of that stuff seems potentially sensitive. The exec deny write mechanism can be removed because we have a decent understanding of the implications and there's decent justification for removing it. So I propose that I do various testing (LTP) etc. now, send the patch and then put this into -next to see if anything breaks?