> On Apr 28, 2024, at 10:39 AM, stsp <stsp2@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > 28.04.2024 19:41, Andy Lutomirski пишет: >>>> On Apr 26, 2024, at 6:39 AM, Stas Sergeev <stsp2@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> This patch-set implements the OA2_CRED_INHERIT flag for openat2() syscall. >>> It is needed to perform an open operation with the creds that were in >>> effect when the dir_fd was opened, if the dir was opened with O_CRED_ALLOW >>> flag. This allows the process to pre-open some dirs and switch eUID >>> (and other UIDs/GIDs) to the less-privileged user, while still retaining >>> the possibility to open/create files within the pre-opened directory set. >>> >> Then two different things could be done: >> >> 1. The subtree could be used unmounted or via /proc magic links. This >> would be for programs that are aware of this interface. >> >> 2. The subtree could be mounted, and accessed through the mount would >> use the captured creds. > Doesn't this have the same problem > that was pointed to me? Namely (explaining > my impl first), that if someone puts the cred > fd to an unaware process's fd table, such > process can't fully drop its privs. He may not > want to access these dirs, but once its hacked, > the hacker will access these dirs with the > creds came from an outside. This is not a real problem. If I have a writable fd for /etc/shadow or an fd for /dev/mem, etc, then I need close them to fully drop privs. The problem is that, in current kernels, directory fds don’t allow access using their f_cred, and changing that means that existing software that does not intend to create a capability will start to do so. > My solution was to close such fds on > exec and disallowing SCM_RIGHTS passage. I don't see what problem this solves. > SCM_RIGHTS can be allowed in the future, > but the receiver will need to use some > new flag to indicate that he is willing to > get such an fd. Passage via exec() can > probably never be allowed however. > > If I understand your model correctly, you > put a magic sub-tree to the fs scope of some > unaware process. Only if I want that process to have access! > He may not want to access > it, but once hacked, the hacker will access > it with the creds from an outside. > And, unlike in my impl, in yours there is > probably no way to prevent that? This is fundamental to the whole model. If I stick a FAT formatted USB drive in the system and mount it, then any process that can find its way to the mountpoint can write to it. And if I open a dirfd, any process with that dirfd can write it. This is old news and isn't a problem. > > In short: my impl confines the hassle within > the single process. It can be extended, and > then the receiver will need to explicitly allow > adding such fds to his fd table. > But your idea seems to inherently require > 2 processes, and there is probably no way > for the second process to say "ok, I allow > such sub-tree in my fs scope". A process could use my proposal to open_tree directory, make a whole new mountns that is otherwise empty, switch to the mountns, mount the directory, then change its UID and drop all privs, and still have access to that one directory. But even right now, a process could unshare userns and mountns, map its uid as some nonzero number, rearrange its mountns so it only has access to that one directory, drop all privs, and seccomp itself, and only have access to that directory, as it still has the same UID. Take your pick.
