On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 1:38 PM Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > > > I know it's everyone's favorite hobby to bash the LSM and LSM devs, > > but it's important to note that we don't add hooks without working > > with the associated subsystem devs to get approval. > > Hah!!!! > > > In the cases > > where we don't get an explicit ACK, there is an on-list approval, or > > several ignored on-list attempts over weeks/months/years. We want to > > be good neighbors. > > Hah!!!! > > You merged a LSM hook that is only good for breaking chrome's sandbox, > over my expressed objections. After I tested and verified that > is what it does. > > I asked for testing. None was done. It was claimed that no > security sensitive code would ever fail to check and deal with > all return codes, so no testing was necessary. Then later a > whole bunch of security sensitive code that didn't was found. > > The only redeeming grace has been that no-one ever actually uses > that misbegotten security hook. > > P.S. Sorry for this off topic rant but sheesh. At least from > my perspective you deserve plenty of bashing. Just in case people are reading this email and don't recall the security_create_user_ns() hook discussions from 2022, I would suggest reading those old threads and drawing your own conclusions. A lore link is below: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/?q=s%3Asecurity_create_user_ns -- paul-moore.com
