On Tue, 22 Sep 2009, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > The fatal flaw of syscall interception is race conditions: you look up a > pathname in your interception layer; then when you call into the proper > syscall, the kernel again looks up the same pathname. There is no way to > guarantee that you end up at the same object in both lookups. The security > and fsnotify hooks are placed in the appropriate spots to avoid exactly that. Fatal? You mean, for this corner case that the anti-malware industry lived with for so much time (in Linux and Windows), you're prepared in pushing all the logic that is currently implemented into their modules, into the kernel? This includes process whitelisting, path whitelisting, caches, userspace access API definition, and so on? On top of providing a generally more limited interception. Why don't we instead offer a lower and broader level of interception, letting the users decide if such fatal flaw needs to be addressed or not, in their modules? They get a broader inteception layer, with the option to decide if or if not address certain scenarios, and we get less code inside the kernel. A win/win situation, if you ask me. - Davide -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
