On 2024/01/29 13:10, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> @@ -1519,6 +1519,7 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) >> } >> free_arg_pages(bprm); >> if (bprm->cred) { >> + security_bprm_aborting_creds(bprm); >> mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); >> abort_creds(bprm->cred); > > Why isn't abort_creds calling security_free_cred enough here? Because security_cred_free() from put_cred_rcu() is called from RCU callback rather than from current thread doing execve(). TOMOYO wants to restore attributes of current thread doing execve(). > The fact that somewhere Tomoyo is modifying a credential that the rest > of the kernel sees as read-only, and making it impossible to just > restore that credential is very concerning from a maintenance > perspective. TOMOYO does not use "struct cred"->security. TOMOYO uses only "struct task_struct"->security. struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { .lbs_task = sizeof(struct tomoyo_task), }; TOMOYO uses security_task_alloc() for allocating "struct task_struct"->security, security_task_free() for releasing "struct task_struct"->security, security_bprm_check() for updating "struct task_struct"->security, security_bprm_committed_creds() for erasing old "struct task_struct"->security, security_bprm_aborting_creds() for restoring old "struct task_struct"->security. Commit a6f76f23d297 ("CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials") made TOMOYO impossible to do above. current->in_execve flag was a hack for emulating security_bprm_aborting_creds() using security_prepare_creds(). > Can't Tomoyo simply allow reading of files that have __FMODE_EXEC > set when allow_execve is set, without needing to perform a domain > transition, and later back out that domain transition? No. That does not match TOMOYO's design. allow_execve keyword does not imply "allow opening that file for non-execve() purpose". Also, performing a domain transition before execve() reaches point of no return is the TOMOYO's design, but COW credentials does not allow such behavior.