On Tue, Nov 28, 2023 at 04:05:36PM -0800, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2023 at 11:06 AM Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
> > allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
> > program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
> > unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which
> > privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.
> >
> > This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation
> > mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also
> > constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the
> > previous patch).
> >
> > BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created
> > through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF
> > FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount
> > point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types,
> > prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future,
> > having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow
> > to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the
> > creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself
> > further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF
> > programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is.
> >
> > When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the
> > BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for
> > checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN}
> > capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using
> > capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF
> > token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details.
> >
> > Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF
> > functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary
> > combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while
> > previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now
> > it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have
> > a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF
> > functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice).
> > And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as
> > a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further
> > restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced).
> >
> > Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF)
> > within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable()
> > story of BPF token.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > include/linux/bpf.h | 41 +++++++
> > include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 37 ++++++
> > kernel/bpf/Makefile | 2 +-
> > kernel/bpf/inode.c | 17 ++-
> > kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 17 +++
> > kernel/bpf/token.c | 209 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 37 ++++++
> > 7 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 kernel/bpf/token.c
> >
>
> [...]
>
> > +int bpf_token_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
> > +{
> > + struct bpf_mount_opts *mnt_opts;
> > + struct bpf_token *token = NULL;
> > + struct user_namespace *userns;
> > + struct inode *inode;
> > + struct file *file;
> > + struct path path;
> > + struct fd f;
> > + umode_t mode;
> > + int err, fd;
> > +
> > + f = fdget(attr->token_create.bpffs_fd);
> > + if (!f.file)
> > + return -EBADF;
> > +
> > + path = f.file->f_path;
> > + path_get(&path);
> > + fdput(f);
> > +
> > + if (path.dentry != path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_root) {
> > + err = -EINVAL;
> > + goto out_path;
> > + }
> > + if (path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_op != &bpf_super_ops) {
> > + err = -EINVAL;
> > + goto out_path;
> > + }
> > + err = path_permission(&path, MAY_ACCESS);
> > + if (err)
> > + goto out_path;
> > +
> > + userns = path.dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
> > + /*
> > + * Enforce that creators of BPF tokens are in the same user
> > + * namespace as the BPF FS instance. This makes reasoning about
> > + * permissions a lot easier and we can always relax this later.
> > + */
> > + if (current_user_ns() != userns) {
> > + err = -EPERM;
> > + goto out_path;
> > + }
I should note that the reason I'm saying it makes reasoning about
permissions easier is that this here guarantees that:
file->f_cred->user_ns == file->f_path.dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns
So cases where you would need to check that you have permissions in the
openers userns are equivalent to checking permissions in the token's and
therefore bpffs' userns.
>
> Hey Christian,
>
> I've added stricter userns check as discussed on previous revision,
> and a few lines above fixed BPF FS root check (path.dentry !=
> path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_root). Hopefully that addresses the remaining
> concerns you've had.
>
> I'd appreciate it if you could take another look to double check if
> I'm not messing anything up, and if it all looks good, can I please
> get an ack from you? Thank you!
I'll take a look.
