Re: [PATCH v4 11/36] arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack

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On Mon, Aug 07, 2023 at 11:00:16PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
> index 8f5b7ce857ed..8f40198cd44e 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -79,8 +79,18 @@ arch_initcall(adjust_protection_map);
>  
>  pgprot_t vm_get_page_prot(unsigned long vm_flags)
>  {
> -	pteval_t prot = pgprot_val(protection_map[vm_flags &
> +	pteval_t prot;
> +
> +	/* If this is a GCS then only interpret VM_WRITE. */
> +	if (system_supports_gcs() && (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
> +		if (vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
> +			prot = _PAGE_GCS;
> +		else
> +			prot = _PAGE_GCS_RO;
> +	} else {
> +		prot = pgprot_val(protection_map[vm_flags &
>  				   (VM_READ|VM_WRITE|VM_EXEC|VM_SHARED)]);
> +	}
>  
>  	if (vm_flags & VM_ARM64_BTI)
>  		prot |= PTE_GP;

Some combinations here don't make sense like GCS + exec or BTI. I think
the code above (correctly) ignores exec but it still sets PTE_GP if BTI
(the architecture may allow this but you can't execute from the GCS page
anyway).

I haven't checked the x86 patches to see when VM_SHADOW_STACK is set but
if there's no additional check at a higher level, we should add
something to arch_validate_flags(), assuming it's called on those paths.

-- 
Catalin



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