Hi! On Wed, Jul 12, 2023 at 12:55:19PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > Thinking more about this, this first step is too restrictive, which > might lead to dangerous situations. > > My main concern is that this approach will deny innocuous or even "good" > IOCTL. For instance, if FIOCLEX is denied, this could leak file > descriptors and then introduce vulnerabilities. This is a good point. > As we discussed before, we cannot categorize all IOCTLs, but I think we > need to add exceptions for a subset of them, and maintain this list. > SELinux has some special handling within selinux_file_ioctl(), and we > should use that as a starting point. The do_vfs_ioctl() function is > another important place to look at. The main thing to keep in mind is > that Landlock's goal is to restrict access to data (e.g. FS, network, > IPC, bypass through other processes), not to restrict innocuous (at > least in theory) kernel features. > > I think, at least all IOCTLs targeting file descriptors themselves should > always be allowed, similar to fcntl(2)'s F_SETFD and F_SETFL commands: > - FIOCLEX > - FIONCLEX > - FIONBIO > - FIOASYNC > > Some others may not be a good idea: > - FIONREAD should be OK in theory but the VFS part only target regular > files and there is no access check according to the read right, which is > weird. > - FICLONE, FICLONERANGE, FIDEDUPRANGE: read/write actions. > > We should add a built-time or run-time safeguard to be sure that future > FD IOCTLs will be added to this list. I'm not sure how to efficiently > implement such protection though. I need to ponder it a bit.. :) I also don't see an obvious solution yet how to tie these lists of ioctls together. > I'm also wondering if we should not split the IOCTL access right into > three: mostly read, mostly write, and misc. _IOC_READ and _IOC_WRITE are > definitely not perfect, but tied to specific drivers (i.e. not a file > hierarchy but a block or character device) this might help until we get > a more fine-grained IOCTL access control. We should check if it's worth > it according to commonly used drivers. Looking at the TTY driver, most > IOCTLs are without read or write markers. Using this split could induce > a false sense of security, so it should be well motivated. As it was pointed out by the LWN article that Jeff Xu pointed to [1], this read/write bit in the ioctl command number is only referring to whether the *argument pointer* to the ioctl is being read or written, but you can not use this bit to infer whether the ioctl itself performs a "reading" or "writing" access to the underlying file. As the LWN article explains, SELinux has fallen for the same trap in the past, the post [2] has an example for an ioctl where the read/write bits for the argument are not related to what the underlying operation does. It might be that you could potentially use the _IOC_READ and _IOC_WRITE bits to group smaller subsets of the ioctl cmd space, such as for a single device type. But then, the users would have to go through the list of supported ioctls one by one anyway, to ensure that this works for that subset. If they are going through them one by one anyway, they might maybe just as well list them out in the filter rule...? [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/428140 [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/428142/ I've also pondered more about the ioctl support. I have a work-in-progress patch set which filters ioctls according to various criteria, but it's not fully fleshed out yet. In the big picture: I think that the main ways how we can build this differently are (a) the criteria on which to decide whether an ioctl is permitted, and (b) the time at which we evaluate these criteria (time of open() vs. time of ioctl()). We can also evaluate the criteria at different times, depending on which criterium it is. So: (a) The criteria on which to decide that an ioctl is permitted: We have discussed the followowing ones so far: * The *ioctl cmd* (request) itself - needs to be taken into account, obviously. - ioctl cmds do not have an obvious ordering exposed to userspace, so asking users to specify ranges is potentially difficult - asking users to list all individual ioctls they do might result in lists that are larger than I had thought. I've straced Firefox and found that it did about 20-30 direct-rendering related ioctls, and most of them were specific to my graphics card... o_O so I assume that there are more of these for other graphics cards. * The *file device ID* (major / minor) - specifying ranges is a good idea - ranges of device IDs are logically grouped and the order is also exposed and documented to user space. * The *file type*, read from filp->f_mode - includes regular files, directories, char devices, block devices, fifos and sockets - BUT this list of types in non-exhaustive: - there are valid struct file objects which have special types and are not distinguishable. They might not have a file type set in f_mode, even. Examples include pidfds, or the Landlock ruleset FD. -- so: we do need a way to ignore file type altogether in an ioctl rule, so that such "special" file types can still be matched in the rule. * The *file path* - This can only really be checked against at open() time, imho. Doing it during the ioctl is too late, because the file might have been created in a different mount namespace, and then the current thread can't really make that file work with ioctls. - Not all open files *have* a file path (i.e. sockets, Landlock ruleset) (b) The time at which the criteria are checked: * During open(): - A check at this time is necessary to match against file paths, imho, as we already to in the ioctl patch set I've sent. * During ioctl(): - A check at this time is *also* necessary, because without that, we will not be able to restrict ioctls on TTYs and other file descriptors that are obtained from other processes. The tentative approach I've taken in my own patch set and the WIP part so far is: (1) Do file path checks at open() time (modeled as a access_fs right) (2) Do cmds, device ID and file type checks at ioctl() time. This is modeled independently of the file path check. -- both checks need to pass independently for an ioctl invocation to be permitted. The API of that approach is: * The ruleset attribute gets a new handled_misc field, and when setting the first bit in it, it'll deny all ioctls unless there is a special ioctl rule added for them (and the path of the file was OK for ioctl at open time). * A new rule type with an associated struct landlock_ioctl_attr - that struct lets users define: - the desired mask of file types (or 0 for "all") - the designed device ID range - the list of ioctl cmds to be permitted for such files An open question is whether the ruleset attr's "handled_misc" field should rather be a "handled_ioctl_cmds" field, a set of restricted ioctl cmds (potentially [0, 2^32)). I think that would be more consistent conceptually with how it was done for file system access rights, but obviously we can't model it as a bit field any more - it would have to be some other suitable representation of a set of integers, which also lets people say "all ioctls". The upside of that approach would be that it could also be used to selectively restrict specific known-evil ioctls, and letting all others continue to work. For example, sandboxing or sudo-like programs could filter out TIOCSTI and TIOCLINUX. I'd be interested in hearing your opinion about this (also from the Chromium side). Thanks, —Günther -- Sent using Mutt 🐕 Woof Woof
