On Fri, Apr 14, 2023 at 03:30:30PM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote:
>
>
> > On Apr 14, 2023, at 11:13, Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Apr 14, 2023 at 02:21:00PM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>> On Apr 14, 2023, at 09:41, Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Fri, Apr 14, 2023 at 06:06:38AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> >>>> On Fri, 2023-04-14 at 03:43 +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> >>>>> On Fri, Apr 14, 2023 at 08:41:03AM +1000, NeilBrown wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> The path name that appears in /proc/mounts is the key that must be used
> >>>>>> to find and unmount a filesystem. When you do that "find"ing you are
> >>>>>> not looking up a name in a filesystem, you are looking up a key in the
> >>>>>> mount table.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> No. The path name in /proc/mounts is *NOT* a key - it's a best-effort
> >>>>> attempt to describe the mountpoint. Pathname resolution does not work
> >>>>> in terms of "the longest prefix is found and we handle the rest within
> >>>>> that filesystem".
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> We could, instead, create an api that is given a mount-id (first number
> >>>>>> in /proc/self/mountinfo) and unmounts that. Then /sbin/umount could
> >>>>>> read /proc/self/mountinfo, find the mount-id, and unmount it - all
> >>>>>> without ever doing path name lookup in the traditional sense.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> But I prefer your suggestion. LOOKUP_MOUNTPOINT could be renamed
> >>>>>> LOOKUP_CACHED, and it only finds paths that are in the dcache, never
> >>>>>> revalidates, at most performs simple permission checks based on cached
> >>>>>> content.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> umount /proc/self/fd/42/barf/something
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Does any of that involve talking to the server? I don't necessarily see
> >>>> a problem with doing the above. If "something" is in cache then that
> >>>> should still work.
> >>>>
> >>>> The main idea here is that we want to avoid communicating with the
> >>>> backing store during the umount(2) pathwalk.
> >>>>
> >>>>> Discuss.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> OTON, umount-by-mount-id is an interesting idea, but we'll need to decide
> >>>>> what would the right permissions be for it.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> But please, lose the "mount table is a mapping from path prefix to filesystem"
> >>>>> notion - it really, really is not. IIRC, there are systems that work that way,
> >>>>> but it's nowhere near the semantics used by any Unices, all variants of Linux
> >>>>> included.
> >>>>
> >>>> I'm not opposed to something by umount-by-mount-id either. All of this
> >>>> seems like something that should probably rely on CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> >>>
> >>> The permission model needs to account for the fact that mount ids are
> >>> global and as such you could in principle unmount any mount in any mount
> >>> namespace. IOW, you can circumvent lookup restrictions completely.
> >>>
> >>> So we could resolve the mnt-id to an FMODE_PATH and then very roughly
> >>> with no claim to solving everything:
> >>>
> >>> may_umount_by_mnt_id(struct path *opath)
> >>> {
> >>> struct path root;
> >>> bool reachable;
> >>>
> >>> // caller in principle able to circumvent lookup restrictions
> >>> if (!may_cap_dac_readsearch())
> >>> return false;
> >>>
> >>> // caller can mount in their mountns
> >>> if (!may_mount())
> >>> return false;
> >>>
> >>> // target mount and caller in the same mountns
> >>> if (!check_mnt())
> >>> return false;
> >>>
> >>> // caller could in principle reach mount from it's root
> >>> get_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
> >>> reachable = is_path_reachable(real_mount(opath->mnt), opath->dentry, &root);
> >>> path_put(&root);
> >>>
> >>> return reachable;
> >>> }
> >>>
> >>> However, that still means that we have laxer restrictions on unmounting
> >>> by mount-id then on unmount with lookup as for lookup just having
> >>> CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH isn't enough. Usually - at least for filesytems
> >>> without custom permission handlers - we also establish that the inode
> >>> can be mapped into the caller's idmapping.
> >>>
> >>> So that would mean that unmounting by mount-id would allow you to
> >>> unmount mounts in cases where you wouldn't with umount. That might be
> >>> fine though as that's ultimately the goal here in a way.
> >>>
> >>> One could also see a very useful feature in this where you require
> >>> capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) and capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) and then allow
> >>> unmounting any mount in the system by mount-id. This would obviously be
> >>> very useful for privileged service managers but I haven't thought this
> >>> Through.
> >>
> >> That is exactly why having a separate syscall to do the lookup of the mount-id is good: it provides separation of privilege.
> >>
> >> The conversion of mount-id to an O_PATH file descriptor is just akin to a path lookup, so only needs CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH (since you require privilege only to bypass the ACL directory read and lookup restrictions). The resulting O_PATH file descriptor has no special properties that require any further privilege.
> >>
> >> Then use that resulting file descriptor for the umount, which normally requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> >
> > There's a difference between unmounting directly by providing a mount id
> > and getting an O_PATH file descriptor from a mnt-id. If you can simply
> > unmount by mount-id it's useful for users that have CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
> > in a container. Without it you likely need to require
> > capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) aka system level privileges just like
> > open_to_handle_at() which makes this interface way less generic and
> > usable. Otherwise you'd be able to get an O_PATH fd to something that
> > you wouldn't be able to access through normal path lookup.
>
>
> Being able to convert into an O_PATH descriptor gives you more options
> than just unmounting. It should allow you to syncfs() before
> unmounting. It should allow you to call open_tree() so you can
> manipulate the filesystem that is no longer accessible by path walk
> (e.g. so you can bind it elsewhere or move it).
I'm not saying it's wrong. I'm just saying there are trade-offs. Sure
this is useful but it'll need to be a pretty privileged api which might
be fine.
