On Tue, Mar 7, 2023 at 11:16 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Mar 03, 2023 at 11:13:51PM +0800, Gao Xiang wrote:
> > Hi Alexander,
> >
> > On 2023/3/3 21:57, Alexander Larsson wrote:
> > > On Mon, Feb 27, 2023 at 10:22 AM Alexander Larsson <alexl@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > But I know for the people who are more interested in using composefs
> > > for containers the eventual goal of rootless support is very
> > > important. So, on behalf of them I guess the question is: Is there
> > > ever any chance that something like composefs could work rootlessly?
> > > Or conversely: Is there some way to get rootless support from the
> > > overlay approach? Opinions? Ideas?
> >
> > Honestly, I do want to get a proper answer when Giuseppe asked me
> > the same question. My current view is simply "that question is
> > almost the same for all in-kernel fses with some on-disk format".
>
> As far as I'm concerned filesystems with on-disk format will not be made
> mountable by unprivileged containers. And I don't think I'm alone in
> that view. The idea that ever more parts of the kernel with a massive
> attack surface such as a filesystem need to vouchesafe for the safety in
> the face of every rando having access to
> unshare --mount --user --map-root is a dead end and will just end up
> trapping us in a neverending cycle of security bugs (Because every
> single bug that's found after making that fs mountable from an
> unprivileged container will be treated as a security bug no matter if
> justified or not. So this is also a good way to ruin your filesystem's
> reputation.).
>
> And honestly, if we set the precedent that it's fine for one filesystem
> with an on-disk format to be able to be mounted by unprivileged
> containers then other filesystems eventually want to do this as well.
>
> At the rate we currently add filesystems that's just a matter of time
> even if none of the existing ones would also want to do it. And then
> we're left arguing that this was just an exception for one super
> special, super safe, unexploitable filesystem with an on-disk format.
>
> Imho, none of this is appealing. I don't want to slowly keep building a
> future where we end up running fuzzers in unprivileged container to
> generate random images to crash the kernel.
>
> I have more arguments why I don't think is a path we will ever go down
> but I don't want this to detract from the legitimate ask of making it
> possible to mount trusted images from within unprivileged containers.
> Because I think that's perfectly legitimate.
>
> However, I don't think that this is something the kernel needs to solve
> other than providing the necessary infrastructure so that this can be
> solved in userspace.
So, I completely understand this point of view. And, since I'm not
really hearing any other viewpoint from the linux vfs developers it
seems to be a shared opinion. So, it seems like further work on the
kernel side of composefs isn't really useful anymore, and I will focus
my work on the overlayfs side. Maybe we can even drop the summit topic
to avoid a bunch of unnecessary travel?
That said, even though I understand (and even agree) with your
worries, I feel it is kind of unfortunate that we end up with
(essentially) a setuid helper approach for this. Because it feels like
we're giving up on a useful feature (trustless unprivileged mounts)
that the kernel could *theoretically* deliver, but a setuid helper
can't. Sure, if you have a closed system you can limit what images can
get mounted to images signed by a trusted key, but it won't work well
for things like user built images or publically available images.
Unfortunately practicalities kinda outweigh theoretical advantages.
--
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Alexander Larsson Red Hat, Inc
alexl@xxxxxxxxxx alexander.larsson@xxxxxxxxx
