Re: [PATCH v8 4/9] landlock: Support file truncation

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On 01/10/2022 17:49, Günther Noack wrote:
Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag for file truncation.

This flag hooks into the path_truncate LSM hook and covers file
truncation using truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) with O_TRUNC, as
well as creat().

This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates
corresponding selftests, and updates code documentation to document
the flag.

The following operations are restricted:

open(): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right if a file gets
implicitly truncated as part of the open() (e.g. using O_TRUNC).

Notable special cases:
* open(..., O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC) can truncate files as well in Linux
* open() with O_TRUNC does *not* need the TRUNCATE right when it
   creates a new file.

truncate() (on a path): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
right.

ftruncate() (on a file): requires that the file had the TRUNCATE right
when it was previously opened.

Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@xxxxxxxxx>
---
  include/uapi/linux/landlock.h                |  21 +++-
  security/landlock/fs.c                       | 102 +++++++++++++++++--
  security/landlock/fs.h                       |  24 +++++
  security/landlock/limits.h                   |   2 +-
  security/landlock/setup.c                    |   1 +
  security/landlock/syscalls.c                 |   2 +-
  tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c |   2 +-
  tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c   |   7 +-
  8 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 23df4e0e8ace..d830cdfdbe56 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -95,8 +95,19 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
   * A file can only receive these access rights:
   *
   * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file.
- * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. Note that
+ *   you might additionally need the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` right in

%LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE


+ *   order to overwrite files with :manpage:`open(2)` using `O_TRUNC` or
+ *   :manpage:`creat(2)`.
   * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE: Truncate a file with :manpage:`truncate(2)`,
+ *   :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, :manpage:`creat(2)`, or :manpage:`open(2)` with
+ *   `O_TRUNC`. Whether an opened file can be truncated with

%O_TRUNC


+ *   :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the
+ *   same way as read and write permissions are checked during
+ *   :manpage:`open(2)` using %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and
+ *   %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE. This access right is available since the
+ *   third version of the Landlock ABI.
   *
   * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories.  The
   * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the
@@ -139,10 +150,9 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
   *
   *   It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions
   *   accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`,
- *   :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`,
- *   :manpage:`chmod(2)`, :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`,
- *   :manpage:`utime(2)`, :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`,
- *   :manpage:`access(2)`.
+ *   :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, :manpage:`chmod(2)`,
+ *   :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, :manpage:`utime(2)`,
+ *   :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`.
   *   Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them.
   */
  /* clang-format off */
@@ -160,6 +170,7 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
  #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK			(1ULL << 11)
  #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM			(1ULL << 12)
  #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER			(1ULL << 13)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE			(1ULL << 14)
  /* clang-format on */
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 083dd3d359de..80d507ce2305 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
  #define ACCESS_FILE ( \
  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
-	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
  /* clang-format on */
/*
@@ -297,6 +298,18 @@ get_handled_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
  	return access_dom & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
  }
+/*
+ * init_layer_masks - Populates @layer_masks such that for each access right in
+ * @access_request, the bits for all the layers are set where this access right
+ * is handled.

Thanks for this extra documentation!

Can you convert it to a proper code documentation (even if it not used yet), with a heading `/**` and a short title following the function name? Something like "init_layer_masks - Initialize layer masks". Please follow this convention for the other doc strings, or just use a paragraph in a simple comment (e.g. for get_required_file_open_access).

Because there is no direct link with Landlock supporting truncation, this should be in a standalone patch, but you can keep it in this series.


+ *
+ * @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions.
+ * @access_request: The requested access rights to check.
+ * @layer_masks: The layer masks to populate.
+ *
+ * Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
+ * in any of the active layers in @domain.
+ */
  static inline access_mask_t
  init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
  		 const access_mask_t access_request,
@@ -1141,9 +1154,19 @@ static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,
  	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR);
  }
+static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path)
+{
+	return current_check_access_path(path, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE);
+}
+
  /* File hooks */
-static inline access_mask_t get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
+/*
+ * get_required_file_open_access - Returns the access rights that are required
+ * for opening the file, depending on the file type and open mode.
+ */
+static inline access_mask_t
+get_required_file_open_access(const struct file *const file)
  {
  	access_mask_t access = 0;
@@ -1163,17 +1186,82 @@ static inline access_mask_t get_file_access(const struct file *const file) static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
  {
+	layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
+	access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access;
+	const access_mask_t optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
  	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
  		landlock_get_current_domain();
- if (!dom)
+	if (!dom) {
+		/*
+		 * Grants all access rights, even if most of them are not
+		 * checked later on. It is more consistent.
+		 */
+		landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;

This looks like the right approach but unfortunately, because there is multiple ways to get a file descriptors (e.g. memfd_create, which is worth mentioning in a comment), this doesn't work well. For now, it only makes sense for Landlock to restrict file descriptors obtained through open(2). We can then move this initialization to a new hook implementation for file_alloc_security.

I think this is the bug Nathan reported.

We should have a test with memfd_create(2) to make sure it works as expected. I think the documentation is still correct though.



  		return 0;
+	}
+
  	/*
-	 * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may
-	 * return 0.  This case will be handled with a future Landlock
+	 * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_required_file_open_access()
+	 * may return 0.  This case will be handled with a future Landlock
  	 * evolution.
  	 */
-	return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file));
+	open_access_request = get_required_file_open_access(file);
+
+	/*
+	 * We look up more access than what we immediately need for open(), so
+	 * that we can later authorize operations on opened files.
+	 */
+	full_access_request = open_access_request | optional_access;
+
+	allowed_access = full_access_request;
+	if (!is_access_to_paths_allowed(
+		    dom, &file->f_path,
+		    init_layer_masks(dom, full_access_request, &layer_masks),
+		    &layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {

I'd prefer (less error prone and easier to read) to add an is_access_paths_allowed branch to initialize allowed_access with full_access_request, and tweak this branch to initialize allowed_access with 0 and then populate it according to !layer_masks[access_bit].


+		unsigned long access_bit;
+		unsigned long access_req = full_access_request;

const unsigned long access_req


+
+		/*
+		 * Calculate the actual allowed access rights from layer_masks.
+		 * Remove each access right from allowed_access which has been
+		 * vetoed by any layer.
+		 */
+		for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
+				 ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)) {
+			if (layer_masks[access_bit])
+				allowed_access &= ~BIT_ULL(access_bit); > +		}
+	}

We can move `landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = allowed_access` here to be sure that the struct file allowed access is consistent even if it should not be used (because access may be denied).


+
+	if (open_access_request & ~allowed_access)
+		return -EACCES;

And here invert the check ((open_access_request & allowed_access) == open_access_request) to make it more consistent with other checks…


+
+	/*
+	 * For operations on already opened files (i.e. ftruncate()), it is the
+	 * access rights at the time of open() which decide whether the
+	 * operation is permitted. Therefore, we record the relevant subset of
+	 * file access rights in the opened struct file.
+	 */
+	landlock_file(file)->allowed_access = allowed_access;
+	return 0;

…and return -EACCES here.


+}
+
+static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Allows truncation if the truncate right was available at the time of
+	 * opening the file, to get a consistent access check as for read, write
+	 * and execute operations.
+	 *
+	 * Note: For checks done based on the file's Landlock rights, we enforce

s/file's Landlock rights/file's Landlock allowed access/ maybe?


+	 * them independently of whether the current thread is in a Landlock
+	 * domain, so that open files passed between independent processes
+	 * retain their behaviour.
+	 */
+	if (landlock_file(file)->allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
+		return 0;
+	return -EACCES;
  }
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1193,6 +1281,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),
  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
  	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, hook_path_truncate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, hook_file_truncate),

Please move the hook_file_truncate entry after the hook_file_open one, these entries are in the same order as their hook implementations.


LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
  };
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h
index 8db7acf9109b..488e4813680a 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.h
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.h
@@ -36,6 +36,24 @@ struct landlock_inode_security {
  	struct landlock_object __rcu *object;
  };
+/**
+ * struct landlock_file_security - File security blob
+ *
+ * This information is populated when opening a file in hook_file_open, and
+ * tracks the relevant Landlock access rights that were available at the time
+ * of opening the file. Other LSM hooks use these rights in order to authorize
+ * operations on already opened files.
+ */
+struct landlock_file_security {
+	/**
+	 * @allowed_access: Access rights that were available at the time of
+	 * opening the file. This is not necessarily the full set of access
+	 * rights available at that time, but it's the necessary subset as
+	 * needed to authorize later operations on the open file.
+	 */
+	access_mask_t allowed_access;
+};
+
  /**
   * struct landlock_superblock_security - Superblock security blob
   *
@@ -50,6 +68,12 @@ struct landlock_superblock_security {
  	atomic_long_t inode_refs;
  };
+static inline struct landlock_file_security *
+landlock_file(const struct file *const file)
+{
+	return file->f_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_file;
+}
+
  static inline struct landlock_inode_security *
  landlock_inode(const struct inode *const inode)
  {
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index b54184ab9439..82288f0e9e5e 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
  #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS		16
  #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES		U32_MAX
-#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS		LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
  #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS		((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
  #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index f8e8e980454c..3f196d2ce4f9 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false;
struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
  	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security),
+	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct landlock_file_security),
  	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security),
  	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
  };
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 735a0865ea11..f4d6fc7ed17f 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
  	.write = fop_dummy_write,
  };
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 2
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3
/**
   * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
index da9290817866..72cdae277b02 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)
  	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
  		.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
  	};
-	ASSERT_EQ(2, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
+	ASSERT_EQ(3, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
  					     LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index 45de42a027c5..87b28d14a1aa 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -406,9 +406,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)
  #define ACCESS_FILE ( \
  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
-	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
-#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
+#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
#define ACCESS_ALL ( \
  	ACCESS_FILE | \
@@ -422,7 +423,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)
  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \
  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \
  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \
-	ACCESS_LAST)
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
/* clang-format on */



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