On 10/07/2022 11:57, Günther Noack wrote:
Hello Mickaël!
Thank you for the fast feedback! I'm looking into your comments from
this mail and the rest of the thread and am working on an updated
patch set.
On Fri, Jul 08, 2022 at 01:16:29PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
Hi Günther, this looks good!
Added linux-fsdevel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
On 07/07/2022 22:06, Günther Noack wrote:
The goal of these patches is to work towards a more complete coverage
of file system operations that are restrictable with Landlock.
The known set of currently unsupported file system operations in
Landlock is described at [1]. Out of the operations listed there,
truncate is the only one that modifies file contents, so these patches
should make it possible to prevent the direct modification of file
contents with Landlock.
The patch introduces the truncate(2) restriction feature as an
additional bit in the access_mask_t bitmap, in line with the existing
supported operations.
Apart from Landlock, the truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) family of system
calls can also be restricted using seccomp-bpf, but it is a
complicated mechanism (requires BPF, requires keeping up-to-date
syscall lists) and it also is not configurable by file hierarchy, as
Landlock is. The simplicity and flexibility of the Landlock approach
makes it worthwhile adding.
I am aware that the documentation and samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
tool still need corresponding updates; I'm hoping to get some early
feedback this way.
Yes, that's a good approach.
Extending the sandboxer should be straightforward, you can just extend the
scope of LL_FS_RW, taking into account the system Landlock ABI because there
is no "contract" for this sample.
Sounds good, I'll extend the sample tool like this for the updated patch set.
(On the side, as you know from the discussion on the go-landlock
library, I have some suspicion that the "best effort"
backwards-compatibility approach in the sample tool is not the right
one for the "refer" right, but that might be better suited for a
separate patch. Maybe it'll be simpler to just not support a
best-effort downgrade in the sample tool.)
Please share your though about the "refer" right.
You'll need to remove the warning about truncate(2) in the documentation,
and maybe to move it to the "previous limitations" section, with the
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_TRUNCATE doc pointing to it. I think it would be nice to
extend the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE documentation to point to
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE because this distinction could be disturbing for
users. Indeed, all inode-based LSMs (SELinux and Smack) deny such action if
the inode is not writable (with the inode_permission check), which is not
the case for path-based LSMs (AppArmor and Tomoyo).
This makes a lot of sense, I'll work on the documentation to point this out.
I suspect that for many common use cases, the
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right will anyway only be used together
with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_FILE_WRITE in practice. (See below for more
detail.)
Agree
While we may question whether a dedicated access right should be added for
the Landlock use case, two arguments are in favor of this approach:
- For compatibility reasons, the kernel must follow the semantic of a
specific Landlock ABI, otherwise it could break user space. We could still
backport this patch and merge it with the ABI 1 and treat it as a bug, but
the initial version of Landlock was meant to be an MVP, hence this lack of
access right.
- There is a specific access right for Capsicum (CAP_FTRUNCATE) that could
makes more sense in the future.
Following the Capsicum semantic, I think it would be a good idea to also
check for the O_TRUNC open flag:
https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=rights
open() with O_TRUNC was indeed a case I had not thought about - thanks
for pointing it out.
I started adding some tests for it, and found to my surprise that
open() *is* already checking security_path_truncate() when it is
truncating files. So there is a chance that we can get away without a
special check for O_TRUNC in the security_file_open hook.
The exact semantics might be slightly different to Capsicum though -
in particular, the creat() call (= open with O_TRUNC|O_CREAT|O_WRONLY)
will require the Landlock truncate right when it's overwriting an
existing regular file, but it will not require the Landlock truncate
right when it's creating a new file.
Is the creat() check really different from what is done by Capsicum?
I'm not fully sure how this is done in Capsicum. I assume that the
Comparison with Capsicum is mostly for inspiration, but there is no
goal of being fully compatible with that model?
I think Landlock has all the technical requirements to implement a
Capsicum-like on Linux: unprivileged access control (which implies
scoped access control, policies composition, only new restrictions,
nesting, dedicated syscalls…). The main difference with the actual
Landlock sandboxing would be that restrictions would apply to all
processes doing actions on a specific kind of file descriptor (i.e.
capability). Instead of checking the current thread's domain, Landlock
could check the "file descriptor's domain". We're definitely not there
yet but let's keep this in mind. ;)
The creat() behaviour is non-intuitive from userspace, I think:
creat() is a pretty common way to create new files, and it might come
as a surprise to people that this can require the truncate right,
because:
- The function creat() doesn't have "truncate" in its name, and you
might be tempted to think that the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG is
sufficient for calling it.
- Users can work around the need for the truncate right by unlinking
the existing regular file with the same name and creating a new one.
So for the most common use case (where users do not care about the
file's inode identity or race conditions), it is surprising that
the truncate right is required.
These are useful information to put in the documentation. Explaining why
it is required should help users. From my point of view, the logic
behind is that replacing a file modifies its content (i.e. shrink it to
zero), while unlinking a file doesn't change its content but makes it
unreachable (removes it) from a directory (and it might not be deleted
if linked elsewhere).
Summarizing this, I also think that the truncate right needs to be a
separate flag, even if just for backwards compatibility reasons.
But at the same time, I suspect that in practice, the truncate right
will probably have to usually go together with the file_write right,
so that the very common creat() use case (and possibly others) does
not yield surprising behaviour.
Agree. User space libraries might (and probably should) have a different
interface than the raw syscalls. The Landlock syscalls are meant to
provide a flexible interface for different use cases. We should keep in
mind that the goal of libraries is to help developers. ;)
