Re: procfs: open("/proc/self/fd/...") allows bypassing O_RDONLY

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On 12/05/2022 14.38, Simon Ser wrote:
> On Thursday, May 12th, 2022 at 14:30, Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
>> Clients can also readlink("/proc/self/fd/<fd>") to get the path of the file
>> and open it from its path (if path is accessible in their mount namespace).
> 
> What the compositor does is:
> 
> - shm_open with O_RDWR
> - Write the kyeboard keymap
> - shm_open again the same file with O_RDONLY
> - shm_unlink
> - Send the O_RDONLY FD to clients
> 
> Thus, the file doesn't exist anymore when clients get the FD.

So, what happens if you do fchmod(fd, 0400) on the fd before passing it
to the client [1].

I assume the client is not running as the same uid as the compositor (so
it can't fchmod() the inode back); if it is, then it could just ptrace
you and all bets are off.

[1] or for that matter, simply specify 0400 as the mode argument when
creating the file - that's perfectly legal to do in conjunction with
O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, and should probably be done to prevent
anybody else from opening the same shm file with write permission before
it gets shm_unlinked.

Rasmus



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