on 2022/4/14 20:45, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 14, 2022 at 03:57:18PM +0800, Yang Xu wrote:
>> Currently, vfs only passes mode argument to filesystem, then use inode_init_owner()
>> to strip S_ISGID. Some filesystem(ie ext4/btrfs) will call inode_init_owner
>> firstly, then posxi acl setup, but xfs uses the contrary order. It will affect
>> S_ISGID clear especially we filter S_IXGRP by umask or acl.
>>
>> Regardless of which filesystem is in use, failure to strip the SGID correctly is
>> considered a security failure that needs to be fixed. The current VFS infrastructure
>> requires the filesystem to do everything right and not step on any landmines to
>> strip the SGID bit, when in fact it can easily be done at the VFS and the filesystems
>> then don't even need to be aware that the SGID needs to be (or has been stripped) by
>> the operation the user asked to be done.
>>
>> Vfs has all the info it needs - it doesn't need the filesystems to do everything
>> correctly with the mode and ensuring that they order things like posix acl setup
>> functions correctly with inode_init_owner() to strip the SGID bit.
>>
>> Just strip the SGID bit at the VFS, and then the filesystems can't get it wrong.
>>
>> Also, the inode_sgid_strip() api should be used before IS_POSIXACL() because
>> this api may change mode.
>>
>> Only the following places use inode_init_owner
>> "hugetlbfs/inode.c:846: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> nilfs2/inode.c:354: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> zonefs/super.c:1289: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, parent, S_IFDIR | 0555);
>> reiserfs/namei.c:619: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> jfs/jfs_inode.c:67: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, parent, mode);
>> f2fs/namei.c:50: inode_init_owner(mnt_userns, inode, dir, mode);
>> ext2/ialloc.c:549: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> overlayfs/dir.c:643: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dentry->d_parent->d_inode, mode);
>> ufs/ialloc.c:292: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> ntfs3/inode.c:1283: inode_init_owner(mnt_userns, inode, dir, mode);
>> ramfs/inode.c:64: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> 9p/vfs_inode.c:263: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, NULL, mode);
>> btrfs/tests/btrfs-tests.c:65: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, NULL, S_IFREG);
>> btrfs/inode.c:6215: inode_init_owner(mnt_userns, inode, dir, mode);
>> sysv/ialloc.c:166: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> omfs/inode.c:51: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, NULL, mode);
>> ubifs/dir.c:97: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> udf/ialloc.c:108: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> ext4/ialloc.c:979: inode_init_owner(mnt_userns, inode, dir, mode);
>> hfsplus/inode.c:393: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> xfs/xfs_inode.c:840: inode_init_owner(mnt_userns, inode, dir, mode);
>> ocfs2/dlmfs/dlmfs.c:331: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, NULL, mode);
>> ocfs2/dlmfs/dlmfs.c:354: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, parent, mode);
>> ocfs2/namei.c:200: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> minix/bitmap.c:255: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> bfs/dir.c:99: inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> "
>
> For completeness sake, there's also spufs which doesn't really go
> through the regular VFS callpath because it has separate system calls
> like:
>
> SYSCALL_DEFINE4(spu_create, const char __user *, name, unsigned int, flags,
> umode_t, mode, int, neighbor_fd)
>
> but looking through the code it only allows the creation of directories and only
> allows bits in 0777.
IMO, this fs also doesn't use inode_init_owner, so it should be not
affected. We add indo_sgid_strip into vfs, IMO, it only happen new sgid
strip situation and doesn't happen to remove old sgid strip situation.
So I think it is "safe".
>
>>
>> They are used in filesystem init new inode function and these init inode functions are used
>> by following operations:
>> mkdir
>> symlink
>> mknod
>> create
>> tmpfile
>> rename
>>
>> We don't care about mkdir because we don't strip SGID bit for directory except fs.xfs.irix_sgid_inherit.
>> symlink and rename only use valid mode that doesn't have SGID bit.
>>
>> We have added inode_sgid_strip api for the remaining operations.
>>
>> In addition to the above six operations, two filesystems has a little difference
>> 1) btrfs has btrfs_create_subvol_root to create new inode but used non SGID bit mode and can ignore
>> 2) ocfs2 reflink function should add inode_sgid_strip api manually because we don't add it in vfs
>>
>> Last but not least, this patch also changed grpid behaviour for ext4/xfs because the mode passed to
>> them may been changed by inode_sgid_strip.
>
> I think the patch itself is useful as it would move a security sensitive
> operation that is currently burried in individual filesystems into the
> vfs layer. But it has a decent regression potential since it might trip
> filesystems that have so far relied on getting the S_ISGID bit with a
> mode argument. The example being network filesystems that Jeff brought
> up earlier. So this needs a lot of testing and long exposure in -next
> for at least one full kernel cycle imho.
Agreed.
>
>>
>> Suggested-by: Dave Chinner<david@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Yang Xu<xuyang2018.jy@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> fs/inode.c | 4 ----
>> fs/namei.c | 5 ++++-
>> fs/ocfs2/namei.c | 1 +
>> 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
>> index d63264998855..b08bdd73e116 100644
>> --- a/fs/inode.c
>> +++ b/fs/inode.c
>> @@ -2246,10 +2246,6 @@ void inode_init_owner(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
>> /* Directories are special, and always inherit S_ISGID */
>> if (S_ISDIR(mode))
>> mode |= S_ISGID;
>> - else if ((mode& (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)&&
>> - !in_group_p(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, dir))&&
>> - !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, dir, CAP_FSETID))
>> - mode&= ~S_ISGID;
>> } else
>> inode_fsgid_set(inode, mnt_userns);
>> inode->i_mode = mode;
>> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
>> index 3f1829b3ab5b..e03f7defdd30 100644
>> --- a/fs/namei.c
>> +++ b/fs/namei.c
>> @@ -3287,6 +3287,7 @@ static struct dentry *lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct file *file,
>> if (open_flag& O_CREAT) {
>> if (open_flag& O_EXCL)
>> open_flag&= ~O_TRUNC;
>> + inode_sgid_strip(mnt_userns, dir->d_inode,&mode);
>> if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
>> mode&= ~current_umask();
>> if (likely(got_write))
>> @@ -3521,6 +3522,7 @@ struct dentry *vfs_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
>> child = d_alloc(dentry,&slash_name);
>> if (unlikely(!child))
>> goto out_err;
>> + inode_sgid_strip(mnt_userns, dir,&mode);
>
> Hm, an additional question: how is umask stripping currently handled in
> vfs_tmpfile()? I don't see it anywhere. That seems like a bug?
Yes, I think it is a bug.
You can verify this by setting
export MOUNT_OPTIONS='-o noacl'
in your xfstests config.
then in my setgid_create_umask test, you can add is_ixgrp check for
tmpfile and it still have S_IXGRP mode(So yesterday, add additional
check for this mode is meaningful).
For xfs, it seems doesn't have noacl mount options, just disable
CONFIG_XFS_POSIX_ACL.
But, xfs doesn't have this problem becuase it doesn't put
posix_acl_create under CONFIG_XFS_POSIX_ACL situation.
I think we should add this umask stripping here and also should
put xfs posix_acl_create code into CONFIG_XFS_POSIX_ACL situation.
@Darrick What do you think the xfs code change ?
commit mesage may as below:
xfs/xfs_iops: Only do posix acl setup operation under CONFIG_XFS_POSIX_ACL
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
index b34e8e4344a8..61c1d4e85891 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
@@ -146,10 +146,13 @@ xfs_create_need_xattr(
struct posix_acl *default_acl,
struct posix_acl *acl)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_POSIX_ACL
if (acl)
return true;
if (default_acl)
return true;
+#endif
+
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY)
if (dir->i_sb->s_security)
return true;
@@ -183,10 +186,11 @@ xfs_generic_create(
} else {
rdev = 0;
}
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_POSIX_ACL
error = posix_acl_create(dir, &mode, &default_acl, &acl);
if (error)
return error;
+#endif
/* Verify mode is valid also for tmpfile case */
error = xfs_dentry_mode_to_name(&name, dentry, mode);
Best Regards
Yang Xu
>
>> error = dir->i_op->tmpfile(mnt_userns, dir, child, mode);
>> if (error)
>> goto out_err;
>> @@ -3850,13 +3852,14 @@ static int do_mknodat(int dfd, struct filename *name, umode_t mode,
>> if (IS_ERR(dentry))
>> goto out1;
>>
>> + mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path.mnt);
>> + inode_sgid_strip(mnt_userns, path.dentry->d_inode,&mode);
>> if (!IS_POSIXACL(path.dentry->d_inode))
>> mode&= ~current_umask();
>
> It would be worth to add another helper prepare_mode() that calls
> inode_sgid_strip() and does the umask stripping as well and then call it
> in all these places. You should even call it in do_mkdirat() since
> inode_sgid_strip() will skip directories anyway. This will enforce the
> same ordering for all relevant operations and it will make the code more
> uniform and easier to understand.
Sound reasonable. I will think of it.
>
>> error = security_path_mknod(&path, dentry, mode, dev);
>> if (error)
>> goto out2;
>>
>> - mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path.mnt);
>> switch (mode& S_IFMT) {
>> case 0: case S_IFREG:
>> error = vfs_create(mnt_userns, path.dentry->d_inode,
>> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/namei.c b/fs/ocfs2/namei.c
>> index c75fd54b9185..f1d626697302 100644
>> --- a/fs/ocfs2/namei.c
>> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/namei.c
>> @@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ static struct inode *ocfs2_get_init_inode(struct inode *dir, umode_t mode)
>> * callers. */
>> if (S_ISDIR(mode))
>> set_nlink(inode, 2);
>> + inode_sgid_strip(&init_user_ns, dir,&mode);
>> inode_init_owner(&init_user_ns, inode, dir, mode);
>> status = dquot_initialize(inode);
>> if (status)
>> --
>> 2.27.0
>>
>>
