On Fri, Dec 03, 2021 at 06:31:01PM +0200, Amir Goldstein wrote: > On Fri, Dec 3, 2021 at 5:38 PM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Wed, Nov 17, 2021 at 09:36:42AM +0200, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > > On Wed, Nov 17, 2021 at 3:58 AM David Anderson <dvander@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > > > > Mark Salyzyn (3): > > > > Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr > > > > overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method > > > > overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred > > > > > > > > Mark Salyzyn + John Stultz (1): > > > > overlayfs: inode_owner_or_capable called during execv > > > > > > > > The first three patches address fundamental security issues that should > > > > be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature. > > > > > > > > The fourth adds the feature depends on these other fixes. > > > > > > > > By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the > > > > recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are > > > > checked against the caller's credentials. > > > > > > > > If the principles of least privilege are applied for sepolicy, the > > > > mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's > > > > when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a > > > > lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the > > > > generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector. > > > > > > > > We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all > > > > subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the > > > > caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option > > > > override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature", > > > > existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/overlay_creds > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@xxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Signed-off-by: David Anderson <dvander@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx> > > > > Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx> > > > > Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Cc: linux-doc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > Cc: linux-fsdevel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > Cc: linux-unionfs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > Cc: linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > Cc: kernel-team@xxxxxxxxxxx > > > > Cc: selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > Cc: paulmoore@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > Cc: Luca.Boccassi@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > > > > > > > > --- > > > > > > > > v19 > > > > - rebase. > > > > > > > > > > Hi David, > > > > > > I see that the patch set has changed hands (presumably to Android upstreaming > > > team), but you just rebased v18 without addressing the maintainers concerns [1]. > > > > > > > BTW, where is patch 1 of the series. I can't seem to find it. > > > > I think I was running into issues with getxattr() on underlying filesystem > > as well (if mounter did not have sufficient privileges) and tried to fix > > it. But did not find a good solution at that point of time. > > > > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/1467733854-6314-6-git-send-email-vgoyal@xxxxxxxxxx/ > > > > So basically when overlay inode is being initialized, code will try to > > query "security.selinux" xattr on underlying file to initialize selinux > > label on the overlay inode. For regular filesystems, they bypass the > > security check by calling __vfs_getxattr() when trying to initialize > > this selinux security label. But with layered filesystem, it still > > ends up calling vfs_getxattr() on underlying filesyste. Which means > > it checks for caller's creds and if caller is not priviliged enough, > > access will be denied. > > > > To solve this problem, looks like this patch set is passing a flag > > XATTR_NOSECUROTY so that permission checks are skipped in getxattr() > > path in underlying filesystem. As long as this information is > > not leaked to user space (and remains in overlayfs), it probably is > > fine? And if information is not going to user space, then it probably > > is fine for unprivileged overlayfs mounts as well? > > > > I see a comment from Miklos as well as you that it is not safe to > > do for unprivileged mounts. Can you help me understand why that's > > the case. > > > > > > > Specifically, the patch 2/4 is very wrong for unprivileged mount and > > > > Can you help me understand why it is wrong. (/me should spend more > > time reading the patch. But I am taking easy route of asking you. :-)). > > > > I should have spent more time reading the patch too :-) > I was not referring to the selinux part. That looks fine I guess. > > I was referring to the part of: > "Check impure, opaque, origin & meta xattr with no sepolicy audit > (using __vfs_getxattr) since these operations are internal to > overlayfs operations and do not disclose any data." > I don't know how safe that really is to ignore the security checks > for reading trusted xattr and allow non-privileged mounts to do that. I am also concerned about this. > Certainly since non privileged mounts are likely to use userxattr > anyway, so what's the reason to bypass security? I am not sure. In the early version of patches I think argument was that do not switch to mounter's creds and use caller's creds on underlying filesystem as well. And each caller will be privileged enough to be able to perform the operation. Our take was that how is this model better because in current model only mounter needs to be privileged while in this new model each caller will have to be privileged. But Android guys seemed to be ok with that. So has this assumption changed since early days. If callers are privileged, then vfs_getxattr() on underlying filesystem for overaly internal xattrs should succeed and there is no need for this change. I suspect patches have evolved since then and callers are not as privileged as we expect them to and that's why we are bypassing this check on all overlayfs internal trusted xattrs? This definitely requires much close scrutiny. My initial reaction is that this sounds very scary. In general I would think overlayfs should not bypass the check on underlying fs. Either checks should be done in mounter's context or caller's context (depending on override_creds=on/off). Thanks Vivek > > > > I think that the very noisy patch 1/4 could be completely avoided: > > > > How can it completely avoided. If mounter is not privileged then > > vfs_getxattr() on underlying filesystem will fail. Or if > > override_creds=off, then caller might not be privileged enough to > > do getxattr() but we still should be able to initialize overlay > > inode security label. > > > > My bad. I didn't read the description of the selinux problem > with the re-post and forgot about it. > > > > Can't you use -o userxattr mount option > > > > user xattrs done't work for device nodes and symlinks. > > > > BTW, how will userxattr solve the problem completely. It can be used > > to store overlay specific xattrs but accessing security xattrs on > > underlying filesystem will still be a problem? > > It cannot. > As long as the patch sticks with passing through the > getxattr flags, it looks fine to me. > passing security for trusted.overlay seems dodgy. > > Thanks, > Amir. >
