Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] Deterministic charging of shared memory

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On Tue, Nov 23, 2021 at 01:19:47PM -0800, Mina Almasry wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 23, 2021 at 12:21 PM Johannes Weiner <hannes@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 03:09:26PM -0800, Roman Gushchin wrote:
> > > On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 02:04:04PM -0500, Johannes Weiner wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Nov 19, 2021 at 08:50:06PM -0800, Mina Almasry wrote:
> > > > > Problem:
> > > > > Currently shared memory is charged to the memcg of the allocating
> > > > > process. This makes memory usage of processes accessing shared memory
> > > > > a bit unpredictable since whichever process accesses the memory first
> > > > > will get charged. We have a number of use cases where our userspace
> > > > > would like deterministic charging of shared memory:
> > > > >
> > > > > 1. System services allocating memory for client jobs:
> > > > > We have services (namely a network access service[1]) that provide
> > > > > functionality for clients running on the machine and allocate memory
> > > > > to carry out these services. The memory usage of these services
> > > > > depends on the number of jobs running on the machine and the nature of
> > > > > the requests made to the service, which makes the memory usage of
> > > > > these services hard to predict and thus hard to limit via memory.max.
> > > > > These system services would like a way to allocate memory and instruct
> > > > > the kernel to charge this memory to the client’s memcg.
> > > > >
> > > > > 2. Shared filesystem between subtasks of a large job
> > > > > Our infrastructure has large meta jobs such as kubernetes which spawn
> > > > > multiple subtasks which share a tmpfs mount. These jobs and its
> > > > > subtasks use that tmpfs mount for various purposes such as data
> > > > > sharing or persistent data between the subtask restarts. In kubernetes
> > > > > terminology, the meta job is similar to pods and subtasks are
> > > > > containers under pods. We want the shared memory to be
> > > > > deterministically charged to the kubernetes's pod and independent to
> > > > > the lifetime of containers under the pod.
> > > > >
> > > > > 3. Shared libraries and language runtimes shared between independent jobs.
> > > > > We’d like to optimize memory usage on the machine by sharing libraries
> > > > > and language runtimes of many of the processes running on our machines
> > > > > in separate memcgs. This produces a side effect that one job may be
> > > > > unlucky to be the first to access many of the libraries and may get
> > > > > oom killed as all the cached files get charged to it.
> > > > >
> > > > > Design:
> > > > > My rough proposal to solve this problem is to simply add a
> > > > > ‘memcg=/path/to/memcg’ mount option for filesystems:
> > > > > directing all the memory of the file system to be ‘remote charged’ to
> > > > > cgroup provided by that memcg= option.
> > > > >
> > > > > Caveats:
> > > > >
> > > > > 1. One complication to address is the behavior when the target memcg
> > > > > hits its memory.max limit because of remote charging. In this case the
> > > > > oom-killer will be invoked, but the oom-killer may not find anything
> > > > > to kill in the target memcg being charged. Thera are a number of considerations
> > > > > in this case:
> > > > >
> > > > > 1. It's not great to kill the allocating process since the allocating process
> > > > >    is not running in the memcg under oom, and killing it will not free memory
> > > > >    in the memcg under oom.
> > > > > 2. Pagefaults may hit the memcg limit, and we need to handle the pagefault
> > > > >    somehow. If not, the process will forever loop the pagefault in the upstream
> > > > >    kernel.
> > > > >
> > > > > In this case, I propose simply failing the remote charge and returning an ENOSPC
> > > > > to the caller. This will cause will cause the process executing the remote
> > > > > charge to get an ENOSPC in non-pagefault paths, and get a SIGBUS on the pagefault
> > > > > path.  This will be documented behavior of remote charging, and this feature is
> > > > > opt-in. Users can:
> > > > > - Not opt-into the feature if they want.
> > > > > - Opt-into the feature and accept the risk of received ENOSPC or SIGBUS and
> > > > >   abort if they desire.
> > > > > - Gracefully handle any resulting ENOSPC or SIGBUS errors and continue their
> > > > >   operation without executing the remote charge if possible.
> > > > >
> > > > > 2. Only processes allowed the enter cgroup at mount time can mount a
> > > > > tmpfs with memcg=<cgroup>. This is to prevent intential DoS of random cgroups
> > > > > on the machine. However, once a filesysetem is mounted with memcg=<cgroup>, any
> > > > > process with write access to this mount point will be able to charge memory to
> > > > > <cgroup>. This is largely a non-issue because in configurations where there is
> > > > > untrusted code running on the machine, mount point access needs to be
> > > > > restricted to the intended users only regardless of whether the mount point
> > > > > memory is deterministly charged or not.
> > > >
> > > > I'm not a fan of this. It uses filesystem mounts to create shareable
> > > > resource domains outside of the cgroup hierarchy, which has all the
> > > > downsides you listed, and more:
> > > >
> > > > 1. You need a filesystem interface in the first place, and a new
> > > >    ad-hoc channel and permission model to coordinate with the cgroup
> > > >    tree, which isn't great. All filesystems you want to share data on
> > > >    need to be converted.
> > > >
> > > > 2. It doesn't extend to non-filesystem sources of shared data, such as
> > > >    memfds, ipc shm etc.
> > > >
> > > > 3. It requires unintuitive configuration for what should be basic
> > > >    shared accounting semantics. Per default you still get the old
> > > >    'first touch' semantics, but to get sharing you need to reconfigure
> > > >    the filesystems?
> > > >
> > > > 4. If a task needs to work with a hierarchy of data sharing domains -
> > > >    system-wide, group of jobs, job - it must interact with a hierarchy
> > > >    of filesystem mounts. This is a pain to setup and may require task
> > > >    awareness. Moving data around, working with different mount points.
> > > >    Also, no shared and private data accounting within the same file.
> > > >
> > > > 5. It reintroduces cgroup1 semantics of tasks and resouces, which are
> > > >    entangled, sitting in disjunct domains. OOM killing is one quirk of
> > > >    that, but there are others you haven't touched on. Who is charged
> > > >    for the CPU cycles of reclaim in the out-of-band domain?  Who is
> > > >    charged for the paging IO? How is resource pressure accounted and
> > > >    attributed? Soon you need cpu= and io= as well.
> > > >
> > > > My take on this is that it might work for your rather specific
> > > > usecase, but it doesn't strike me as a general-purpose feature
> > > > suitable for upstream.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > If we want sharing semantics for memory, I think we need a more
> > > > generic implementation with a cleaner interface.
> > > >
> > > > Here is one idea:
> > > >
> > > > Have you considered reparenting pages that are accessed by multiple
> > > > cgroups to the first common ancestor of those groups?
> > > >
> > > > Essentially, whenever there is a memory access (minor fault, buffered
> > > > IO) to a page that doesn't belong to the accessing task's cgroup, you
> > > > find the common ancestor between that task and the owning cgroup, and
> > > > move the page there.
> > > >
> > > > With a tree like this:
> > > >
> > > >     root - job group - job
> > > >                         `- job
> > > >             `- job group - job
> > > >                         `- job
> > > >
> > > > all pages accessed inside that tree will propagate to the highest
> > > > level at which they are shared - which is the same level where you'd
> > > > also set shared policies, like a job group memory limit or io weight.
> > > >
> > > > E.g. libc pages would (likely) bubble to the root, persistent tmpfs
> > > > pages would bubble to the respective job group, private data would
> > > > stay within each job.
> > > >
> > > > No further user configuration necessary. Although you still *can* use
> > > > mount namespacing etc. to prohibit undesired sharing between cgroups.
> > > >
> > > > The actual user-visible accounting change would be quite small, and
> > > > arguably much more intuitive. Remember that accounting is recursive,
> > > > meaning that a job page today also shows up in the counters of job
> > > > group and root. This would not change. The only thing that IS weird
> > > > today is that when two jobs share a page, it will arbitrarily show up
> > > > in one job's counter but not in the other's. That would change: it
> > > > would no longer show up as either, since it's not private to either;
> > > > it would just be a job group (and up) page.
> >
> > These are great questions.
> >
> > > In general I like the idea, but I think the user-visible change will be quite
> > > large, almost "cgroup v3"-large.
> >
> > I wouldn't quite say cgroup3 :-) But it would definitely require a new
> > mount option for cgroupfs.
> >
> > > Here are some problems:
> > > 1) Anything shared between e.g. system.slice and user.slice now belongs
> > >    to the root cgroup and is completely unaccounted/unlimited. E.g. all pagecache
> > >    belonging to shared libraries.
> >
> > Correct, but arguably that's a good thing:
> >
> > Right now, even though the libraries are used by both, they'll be held
> > by one group. This can cause two priority inversions: hipri references
> > don't prevent the shared page from thrashing inside a lowpri group,
> > which could subject the hipri group to reclaim pressure and waiting
> > for slow refaults of the lowpri groups; if the lowpri group is the
> > hotter user of this page, this could sustain. Or the page ends up in
> > the hipri group, and the lowpri group pins it there even when the
> > hipri group is done with it, thus stealing its capacity.
> >
> > Yes, a libc page used by everybody in the system would end up in the
> > root cgroup. But arguably that makes much more sense than having it
> > show up as exclusive memory of system.slice/systemd-udevd.service.
> > And certainly we don't want a universally shared page be subjected to
> > the local resource pressure of one lowpri user of it.
> >
> > Recognizing the shared property and propagating it to the common
> > domain - the level at which priorities are equal between them - would
> > make the accounting clearer and solve both these inversions.
> >
> > > 2) It's concerning in security terms. If I understand the idea correctly, a
> > >    read-only access will allow to move charges to an upper level, potentially
> > >    crossing memory.max limits. It doesn't sound safe.
> >
> > Hm. The mechanism is slightly different, but escaping memory.max
> > happens today as well: shared memory is already not subject to the
> > memory.max of (n-1)/n cgroups that touch it.
> >
> > So before, you can escape containment to whatever other cgroup is
> > using the page. After, you can escape to the common domain. It's
> > difficult for me to say one is clearly worse than the other. You can
> > conceive of realistic scenarios where both are equally problematic.
> >
> > Practically, they appear to require the same solution: if the
> > environment isn't to be trusted, namespacing and limiting access to
> > shared data is necessary to avoid cgroups escaping containment or
> > DoSing other groups.
> >
> > > 3) It brings a non-trivial amount of memory to non-leave cgroups. To some extent
> > >    it returns us to the cgroup v1 world and a question of competition between
> > >    resources consumed by a cgroup directly and through children cgroups. Not
> > >    like the problem doesn't exist now, but it's less pronounced.
> > >    If say >50% of system.slice's memory will belong to system.slice directly,
> > >    then we likely will need separate non-recursive counters, limits, protections,
> > >    etc.
> >
> > I actually do see numbers like this in practice. Temporary
> > system.slice units allocate cache, then their cgroups get deleted and
> > the cache is reused by the next instances. Quite often, system.slice
> > has much more memory than its subgroups combined.
> >
> > So in a way, we have what I'm proposing if the sharing happens with
> > dead cgroups. Sharing with live cgroups wouldn't necessarily create a
> > bigger demand for new counters than what we have now.
> >
> > I think the cgroup1 issue was slightly different: in cgroup1 we
> > allowed *tasks* to live in non-leaf groups, and so users wanted to
> > control the *private* memory of said tasks with policies that were
> > *different* from the shared policies applied to the leaves.
> >
> > This wouldn't be the same here. Tasks are still only inside leafs, and
> > there is no "private" memory inside a non-leaf group. It's shared
> > among the children, and so subject to policies shared by all children.
> >
> > > 4) Imagine a production server and a system administrator entering using ssh
> > >    (and being put into user.slice) and running a big grep... It screws up all
> > >    memory accounting until a next reboot. Not a completely impossible scenario.
> >
> > This can also happen with the first-touch model, though. The second
> > you touch private data of some workload, the memory might escape it.
> >
> > It's not as pronounced with a first-touch policy - although proactive
> > reclaim makes this worse. But I'm not sure you can call it a new
> > concern in the proposed model: you already have to be careful with the
> > data you touch and bring into memory from your current cgroup.
> >
> > Again, I think this is where mount namespaces come in. You're not
> > necessarily supposed to see private data of workloads from the outside
> > and access it accidentally. It's common practice to ssh directly into
> > containers to muck with them and their memory, at which point you'll
> > be in the appropriate cgroup and permission context, too.
> >
> > However, I do agree with Mina and you: this is a significant change in
> > behavior, and a cgroupfs mount option would certainly be warranted.
> 
> I don't mean to be a nag here but I have trouble seeing pages being
> re-accounted on minor faults working for us, and that might be fine,
> but I'm expecting if it doesn't really work for us it likely won't
> work for the next person trying to use this.

Yes, I agree, the performance impact might be non-trivial.
I think we discussed something similar in the past in the context
of re-charging pages belonging to a deleted cgroup. And the consensus
was that we'd need to add hooks into many places to check whether
a page belongs to a dying (or other-than-current) cgroup and it might
be not cheap.

> 
> The issue is that the fact that the memory is initially accounted to
> the allocating process forces the sysadmin to overprovision the cgroup
> limit anyway so that the tasks don't oom if tasks are pre-allocating
> memory. The memory usage of a task accessing shared memory stays very
> unpredictable because it's waiting on another task in another cgroup
> to touch the shared memory for the shared memory to be unaccounted to
> its cgroup.
> 
> I have a couple of (admittingly probably controversial) suggestions:
> 1. memcg flag, say memory.charge_for_shared_memory. When we allocate
> shared memory, we charge it to the first ancestor memcg that has
> memory.charge_for_shared_memory==true.

I think the problem here is that we try really hard to avoid any
per-memory-type knobs, and this is another one.

> 2. Somehow on the creation of shared memory, we somehow declare that
> this memory belongs to <cgroup>. Only descendants of <cgroup> are able
> to touch the shared memory and the shared memory is charged to
> <cgroup>.

This sounds like a mount namespace.

Thanks!



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