On Mon, May 31, 2021 at 09:26:35PM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> On Mon, May 31, 2021 at 6:18 PM Miklos Szeredi <miklos@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 18 May 2021 at 19:56, Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 5:43 PM Miklos Szeredi <miklos@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Mon, 10 May 2021 at 18:32, Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > > > > My thinking was that we can change d_real() to provide the real path:
> > > > >
> > > > > static inline struct path d_real_path(struct path *path,
> > > > > const struct inode *inode)
> > > > > {
> > > > > struct realpath = {};
> > > > > if (!unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_REAL))
> > > > > return *path;
> > > > > dentry->d_op->d_real(path->dentry, inode, &realpath);
> > > > > return realpath;
> > > > > }
> >
> > Real paths are internal, we can't pass them (as fd in permission
> > events) to userspace.
> >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Another option, instead of getting the realpath, just detect the
> > > > > mismatch of file_inode(file) != d_inode(path->dentry) in
> > > > > fanotify_file() and pass FSNOTIFY_EVENT_DENTRY data type
> > > > > with d_real() dentry to backend instead of FSNOTIFY_EVENT_PATH.
> > > > >
> > > > > For inotify it should be enough and for fanotify it is enough for
> > > > > FAN_REPORT_FID and legacy fanotify can report FAN_NOFD,
> > > > > so at least permission events listeners can identify the situation and
> > > > > be able to block access to unknown paths.
> >
> > That sounds like a good short term solution.
> >
>
> It may be a fine academic solution, but I don't think it solves any real
> world problem.
> I am not aware of any security oriented solutions that use permission
> events on inode or directory (let alone sb).
>
> The security oriented users of fanotify are anti-virus on-access
> protection engines and those are using mount marks anyway
> (dynamically adding them as far as I know).
> [cc Marko who may be able to shed some light]
>
> For those products, creating a bind mount inside a new mount ns
> may actually escape the on-access policy or the new mount will
> also be marked I am not sure. I suppose cloning mount ns may be
> prohibited by another LSM or something(?).
Yes, this can be restricted in multiple ways. Three spring to mind right
away:
- procfs: write a really low number to /proc/sys/user/max_mnt_namespaces
- seccomp: prevent the clone3() syscall, prevent the legacy clone()
syscall with CLONE_NEWNS, prevent unshare(CLONE_NEWNS)
- use LSM
>
> >
> > >
> > > Is there a reason for the fake path besides the displayed path in
> > > /proc/self/maps?
> >
> > I'm not aware of any.
> >
> > >
> > > Does it make sense to keep one realfile with fake path for mmaped
> > > files along side a realfile with private/detached path used for all the
> > > other operations?
> >
> > This should work, but it would add more open files,
>
> True, but only for the mmaped files.
>
> > so needs some good justifications.
> >
>
> I'm afraid I don't have one yet..
> Let's see what the AV vendors have to say.
>
> Thanks,
> Amir.
