Re: [PATCH] fanotify: fix permission model of unprivileged group

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On Mon, May 24, 2021 at 11:41 AM Matthew Bobrowski <repnop@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Sat, May 22, 2021 at 12:19:16PM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> > Reporting event->pid should depend on the privileges of the user that
> > initialized the group, not the privileges of the user reading the
> > events.
> >
> > Use an internal group flag FANOTIFY_UNPRIV to record the fact the the
> > group was initialized by an unprivileged user.
> >
> > To be on the safe side, the premissions to setup filesystem and mount
> > marks now require that both the user that initialized the group and
> > the user setting up the mark have CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> >
> > Fixes: 7cea2a3c505e ("fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users")
> > Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> Thanks for sending through this patch Amir!
>
> In general, the patch looks good to me, however there's just a few
> nits below.
>
> > diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
> > index 71fefb30e015..7df6cba4a06d 100644
> > --- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
> > +++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
> > @@ -424,11 +424,18 @@ static ssize_t copy_event_to_user(struct fsnotify_group *group,
> >        * events generated by the listener process itself, without disclosing
> >        * the pids of other processes.
> >        */
> > -     if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> > +     if (FAN_GROUP_FLAG(group, FANOTIFY_UNPRIV) &&
> >           task_tgid(current) != event->pid)
> >               metadata.pid = 0;
> >
> > -     if (path && path->mnt && path->dentry) {
> > +     /*
> > +      * For now, we require fid mode for unprivileged listener, which does
> > +      * record path events, but keep this check for safety in case we want
> > +      * to allow unprivileged listener to get events with no fd and no fid
> > +      * in the future.
> > +      */
>
> I think it's best if we keep clear of using first person in our
> comments throughout our code base. Maybe we could change this to:
>
> * For now, fid mode is required for an unprivileged listener, which
>   does record path events. However, this check must be kept...
>
> > +     if (!FAN_GROUP_FLAG(group, FANOTIFY_UNPRIV) &&
> > +         path && path->mnt && path->dentry) {
> >               fd = create_fd(group, path, &f);
> >               if (fd < 0)
> >                       return fd;
> > @@ -1040,6 +1047,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
> >       int f_flags, fd;
> >       unsigned int fid_mode = flags & FANOTIFY_FID_BITS;
> >       unsigned int class = flags & FANOTIFY_CLASS_BITS;
> > +     unsigned int internal_flags = 0;
> >
> >       pr_debug("%s: flags=%x event_f_flags=%x\n",
> >                __func__, flags, event_f_flags);
> > @@ -1053,6 +1061,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
> >                */
> >               if ((flags & FANOTIFY_ADMIN_INIT_FLAGS) || !fid_mode)
> >                       return -EPERM;
> > +
> > +             /*
> > +              * We set the internal flag FANOTIFY_UNPRIV on the group, so we
> > +              * know that we need to limit setting mount/filesystem marks on
> > +              * this group and avoid providing pid and open fd in the event.
> > +              */
>
> Same comment as above applies here. This could be changed to:
>
> * Set the internal FANOTIFY_UNPRIV flag for this notification group so
>   that certain restrictions can be enforced upon it. This includes
>   things like not permitting an unprivileged user from setting up
>   mount/filesystem scoped marks and not returning an open file
>   descriptor or pid meta-information within an event.
>
> You can make it shorter if you like, but you get the drift.
>
> > +             internal_flags |= FANOTIFY_UNPRIV;
> >       }
> >
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> > @@ -1105,7 +1120,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
> >               goto out_destroy_group;
> >       }
> >
> > -     group->fanotify_data.flags = flags;
> > +     group->fanotify_data.flags = flags | internal_flags;
> >       group->memcg = get_mem_cgroup_from_mm(current->mm);
> >
> >       group->fanotify_data.merge_hash = fanotify_alloc_merge_hash();
> > @@ -1305,11 +1320,13 @@ static int do_fanotify_mark(int fanotify_fd, unsigned int flags, __u64 mask,
> >       group = f.file->private_data;
> >
> >       /*
> > -      * An unprivileged user is not allowed to watch a mount point nor
> > -      * a filesystem.
> > +      * An unprivileged user is not allowed to setup mount point nor
>                                                                    ^
>                                                                    s
> > +      * filesystem marks. It is not allowed to setup those marks for
> > +      * a group that was initialized by an unprivileged user.
>
> I think the second sentence would better read as:
>
>        * This also includes setting up such marks by a group that was
>          intialized by an unprivileged user.
>
> >       ret = -EPERM;
> > -     if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> > +     if ((!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
> > +          FAN_GROUP_FLAG(group, FANOTIFY_UNPRIV)) &&
>
> ...
>
> > diff --git a/fs/notify/fdinfo.c b/fs/notify/fdinfo.c
> > index a712b2aaa9ac..57f0d5d9f934 100644
> > --- a/fs/notify/fdinfo.c
> > +++ b/fs/notify/fdinfo.c
> > @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void fanotify_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *f)
> >       struct fsnotify_group *group = f->private_data;
> >
> >       seq_printf(m, "fanotify flags:%x event-flags:%x\n",
> > -                group->fanotify_data.flags,
> > +                group->fanotify_data.flags & FANOTIFY_INIT_FLAGS,
> >                  group->fanotify_data.f_flags);
>
> I feel like the internal initialization flags have been dropped off
> here as FANOTIFY_INIT_FLAGS technically wouldn't cover all flags
> present in group->fanotify_data.flags with FANOTIFY_UNPRIV, right?
>

Right. CRIU reads those values and tries to restore the same
fanotify group on a new running instance, so we must not export flags
not allowed by fanotify_init().


> >       show_fdinfo(m, f, fanotify_fdinfo);
> > diff --git a/include/linux/fanotify.h b/include/linux/fanotify.h
> > index bad41bcb25df..f277d1c4e6b8 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/fanotify.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/fanotify.h
> > @@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ extern struct ctl_table fanotify_table[]; /* for sysctl */
> >  #define FANOTIFY_INIT_FLAGS  (FANOTIFY_ADMIN_INIT_FLAGS | \
> >                                FANOTIFY_USER_INIT_FLAGS)
> >
> > +/* Internal flags */
> > +#define FANOTIFY_UNPRIV              0x80000000
> > +#define FANOTIFY_INTERNAL_FLAGS      (FANOTIFY_UNPRIV)
>
> Should we be more distinct here i.e. FANOTIFY_INTERNAL_INIT_FLAGS?

If anything, it would be FANOTIFY_INTERNAL_GROUP_FLAGS
FANOTIFY_INIT_FLAGS can only be set by fanotify_init(), but internal
flags could potential be set at any time.

> Just thinking about a possible case where there's some other internal
> fanotify flags that are used for something else?
>

I prefer the brevity. It's an internal name so we can always change it later
should it become ambiguous.

Thanks for the review.
I'll send v2 shortly.

Thanks,
Amir.



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