Hi, This second patch replaces the custom is_path_beneath() with the existing path_is_under(). The chroot system call is currently limited to be used by processes with the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability. This protects against malicious procesess willing to trick SUID-like binaries. The following patch allows unprivileged users to safely use chroot(2). This patch is a follow-up of a previous one sent by Andy Lutomirski some time ago: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0e2f0f54e19bff53a3739ecfddb4ffa9a6dbde4d.1327858005.git.luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/ This patch can be applied on top of v5.12-rc2 . I would really appreciate constructive reviews. Previous version: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210310161000.382796-1-mic@xxxxxxxxxxx Regards, Mickaël Salaün (1): fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) fs/open.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) base-commit: a38fd8748464831584a19438cbb3082b5a2dab15 -- 2.30.2
