Re: [PATCH] vfs: fix fsconfig(2) LSM mount option handling for btrfs

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Wed, Dec 16, 2020 at 5:40 PM David Sterba <dsterba@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 18, 2020 at 11:23:42AM +0100, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> > When SELinux security options are passed to btrfs via fsconfig(2) rather
> > than via mount(2), the operation aborts with an error. What happens is
> > roughly this sequence:
> >
> > 1. vfs_parse_fs_param() eats away the LSM options and parses them into
> >    fc->security.
> > 2. legacy_get_tree() finds nothing in ctx->legacy_data, passes this
> >    nothing to btrfs.
> > [here btrfs calls another layer of vfs_kern_mount(), but let's ignore
> >  that for simplicity]
> > 3. btrfs calls security_sb_set_mnt_opts() with empty options.
> > 4. vfs_get_tree() then calls its own security_sb_set_mnt_opts() with the
> >    options stashed in fc->security.
> > 5. SELinux doesn't like that different options were used for the same
> >    superblock and returns -EINVAL.
> >
> > In the case of mount(2), the options are parsed by
> > legacy_parse_monolithic(), which skips the eating away of security
> > opts because of the FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA flag, so they are passed to the
> > FS via ctx->legacy_data. The second call to security_sb_set_mnt_opts()
> > (from vfs_get_tree()) now passes empty opts, but the non-empty -> empty
> > sequence is allowed by SELinux for the FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA case.
> >
> > It is a total mess, but the only sane fix for now seems to be to skip
> > processing the security opts in vfs_parse_fs_param() if the fc has
> > legacy opts set AND the fs specfies the FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA flag. This
> > combination currently matches only btrfs and coda. For btrfs this fixes
> > the fsconfig(2) behavior, and for coda it makes setting security opts
> > via fsconfig(2) fail the same way as it would with mount(2) (because
> > FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA filesystems are expected to call the mount opts LSM
> > hooks themselves, but coda never cared enough to do that). I believe
> > that is an acceptable state until both filesystems (or at least btrfs)
> > are converted to the new mount API (at which point btrfs won't need to
> > pretend it takes binary mount data any more and also won't need to call
> > the LSM hooks itself, assuming it will pass the fc->security information
> > properly).
> >
> > Note that we can't skip LSM opts handling in vfs_parse_fs_param() solely
> > based on FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA because that would break NFS.
> >
> > See here for the original report and reproducer:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/c02674c970fa292610402aa866c4068772d9ad4e.camel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
> >
> > Reported-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Fixes: 3e1aeb00e6d1 ("vfs: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context")
> > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Can we get this merged via the vfs tree, please? Possibly with
>
> CC: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx # 5.4+
>
> > +     /*
> > +      * In the legacy+binary mode, skip the security_fs_context_parse_param()
> > +      * call and let the legacy handler process also the security options.
> > +      * It will format them into the monolithic string, where the FS can
> > +      * process them (with FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA it is expected to do it).
> > +      *
> > +      * Currently, this matches only btrfs and coda. Coda is broken with
> > +      * fsconfig(2) anyway, because it does actually take binary data. Btrfs
> > +      * only *pretends* to take binary data to work around the SELinux's
> > +      * no-remount-with-different-options check, so this allows it to work
> > +      * with fsconfig(2) properly.
> > +      *
> > +      * Once btrfs is ported to the new mount API, this hack can be reverted.
> > +      */
> > +     if (fc->ops != &legacy_fs_context_ops || !(fc->fs_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)) {
>
> Line is way over 80, it could be split like
>
>         if (fc->ops != &legacy_fs_context_ops ||
>             !(fc->fs_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)) {

The chackpatch.pl limit is now 100 chars, so I hoped I would get away
with it :) Splitting conditionals always looks kinda awkward... But I
have no problem with changing it, if the VFS maintainers prefer that.
I would like to get at least *some* feedback from them before I respin
with just style changes...

>
> > +             ret = security_fs_context_parse_param(fc, param);
> > +             if (ret != -ENOPARAM)
> > +                     /* Param belongs to the LSM or is disallowed by the LSM;
> > +                      * so don't pass to the FS.
> > +                      */
>
> The multi line comment should have the /* on a separate line (yes it's
> in the original code too but such things could be fixed when the code is
> moved).

Okay. I prefer the "Linus" format as well, but since different
subsystems still have their own opinions, I figured I'd just leave it
be... But again, I'll be happy to change it if VFS maintainers don't
object.

>
> > +                     return ret;
> > +     }
> >
> >       if (fc->ops->parse_param) {
> >               ret = fc->ops->parse_param(fc, param);
>

-- 
Ondrej Mosnacek
Software Engineer, Platform Security - SELinux kernel
Red Hat, Inc.




[Index of Archives]     [Linux Ext4 Filesystem]     [Union Filesystem]     [Filesystem Testing]     [Ceph Users]     [Ecryptfs]     [AutoFS]     [Kernel Newbies]     [Share Photos]     [Security]     [Netfilter]     [Bugtraq]     [Yosemite News]     [MIPS Linux]     [ARM Linux]     [Linux Security]     [Linux Cachefs]     [Reiser Filesystem]     [Linux RAID]     [Samba]     [Device Mapper]     [CEPH Development]

  Powered by Linux