Re: [PATCH V2 2/2] mm/highmem: Lift memcpy_[to|from]_page to core

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On Tue, Dec 08, 2020 at 01:32:55PM -0800, Ira Weiny wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 07, 2020 at 03:49:55PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 7, 2020 at 3:40 PM Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, Dec 07, 2020 at 03:34:44PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > > On Mon, Dec 7, 2020 at 3:27 PM Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Mon, Dec 07, 2020 at 02:57:03PM -0800, ira.weiny@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
> > > > > > +static inline void memcpy_page(struct page *dst_page, size_t dst_off,
> > > > > > +                            struct page *src_page, size_t src_off,
> > > > > > +                            size_t len)
> > > > > > +{
> > > > > > +     char *dst = kmap_local_page(dst_page);
> > > > > > +     char *src = kmap_local_page(src_page);
> > > > >
> > > > > I appreciate you've only moved these, but please add:
> > > > >
> > > > >         BUG_ON(dst_off + len > PAGE_SIZE || src_off + len > PAGE_SIZE);
> > > >
> > > > I imagine it's not outside the realm of possibility that some driver
> > > > on CONFIG_HIGHMEM=n is violating this assumption and getting away with
> > > > it because kmap_atomic() of contiguous pages "just works (TM)".
> > > > Shouldn't this WARN rather than BUG so that the user can report the
> > > > buggy driver and not have a dead system?
> > >
> > > As opposed to (on a HIGHMEM=y system) silently corrupting data that
> > > is on the next page of memory?
> > 
> > Wouldn't it fault in HIGHMEM=y case? I guess not necessarily...
> > 
> > > I suppose ideally ...
> > >
> > >         if (WARN_ON(dst_off + len > PAGE_SIZE))
> > >                 len = PAGE_SIZE - dst_off;
> > >         if (WARN_ON(src_off + len > PAGE_SIZE))
> > >                 len = PAGE_SIZE - src_off;
> > >
> > > and then we just truncate the data of the offending caller instead of
> > > corrupting innocent data that happens to be adjacent.  Although that's
> > > not ideal either ... I dunno, what's the least bad poison to drink here?
> > 
> > Right, if the driver was relying on "corruption" for correct operation.
> > 
> > If corruption actual were happening in practice wouldn't there have
> > been screams by now? Again, not necessarily...
> > 
> > At least with just plain WARN the kernel will start screaming on the
> > user's behalf, and if it worked before it will keep working.
> 
> So I decided to just sleep on this because I was recently told to not introduce
> new WARN_ON's[1]
> 
> I don't think that truncating len is worth the effort.  The conversions being
> done should all 'work'  At least corrupting users data in the same way as it
> used to...  ;-)  I'm ok with adding the WARN_ON's and I have modified the patch
> to do so while I work through the 0-day issues.  (not sure what is going on
> there.)
> 
> However, are we ok with adding the WARN_ON's given what Greg KH told me?  This
> is a bit more critical than the PKS API in that it could result in corrupt
> data.

zero_user_segments contains:

        BUG_ON(end1 > page_size(page) || end2 > page_size(page));

These should be consistent.  I think we've demonstrated that there is
no good option here.



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