Re: [PATCH v22 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 9:04 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead
> to a privilege escalation.  Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker
> to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing
> malicious activities.  Thanks to  ptrace_may_access(), various part of
> the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee.
>
> A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process
> and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating
> processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a
> target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target
> process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer).
>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>




[Index of Archives]     [Linux Ext4 Filesystem]     [Union Filesystem]     [Filesystem Testing]     [Ceph Users]     [Ecryptfs]     [AutoFS]     [Kernel Newbies]     [Share Photos]     [Security]     [Netfilter]     [Bugtraq]     [Yosemite News]     [MIPS Linux]     [ARM Linux]     [Linux Security]     [Linux Cachefs]     [Reiser Filesystem]     [Linux RAID]     [Samba]     [Device Mapper]     [CEPH Development]

  Powered by Linux