On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 05:07:15AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 07:25:53AM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 08:22:54PM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> > > It was discovered while implementing userspace emulation of fchmodat
> > > AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW (using O_PATH and procfs magic symlinks; otherwise
> > > it's not possible to target symlinks with chmod operations) that some
> > > filesystems erroneously allow access mode of symlinks to be changed,
> > > but return failure with EOPNOTSUPP (see glibc issue #14578 and commit
> > > a492b1e5ef). This inconsistency is non-conforming and wrong, and the
> > > consensus seems to be that it was unintentional to allow link modes to
> > > be changed in the first place.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Rich Felker <dalias@xxxxxxxx>
> > > ---
> > > fs/open.c | 6 ++++++
> > > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> > > index 9af548fb841b..cdb7964aaa6e 100644
> > > --- a/fs/open.c
> > > +++ b/fs/open.c
> > > @@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ int chmod_common(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
> > > struct iattr newattrs;
> > > int error;
> > >
> > > + /* Block chmod from getting to fs layer. Ideally the fs would either
> > > + * allow it or fail with EOPNOTSUPP, but some are buggy and return
> > > + * an error but change the mode, which is non-conforming and wrong. */
> > > + if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
> > > + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >
> > Our usualy place for this would be setattr_prepare. Also the comment
> > style is off, and I don't think we should talk about buggy file systems
> > here, but a policy to not allow the chmod. I also suspect the right
> > error value is EINVAL - EOPNOTSUPP isn't really used in normal posix
> > file system interfaces.
>
> Er... Wasn't that an ACL-related crap? XFS calling posix_acl_chmod()
> after it has committed to i_mode change, propagating the error to
> caller of ->notify_change(), IIRC...
>
> Put it another way, why do we want
> if (!inode->i_op->set_acl)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> in posix_acl_chmod(), when we have
> if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
> return 0;
> right next to it? If nothing else, make that
> if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode) || !inode->i_op->get_acl)
> return 0; // piss off - nothing to adjust here
Arrgh... That'd break shmem and similar filesystems... Still, it
feels like we should _not_ bother in cases when there's no ACL
for that sucker; after all, if get_acl() returns NULL, we quietly
return 0 and that's it.
How about something like this instead?
diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index 95882b3f5f62..2339160fabab 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -559,8 +559,6 @@ posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
if (!IS_POSIXACL(inode))
return 0;
- if (!inode->i_op->set_acl)
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
acl = get_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl)) {
@@ -569,6 +567,10 @@ posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
return PTR_ERR(acl);
}
+ if (!inode->i_op->set_acl) {
+ posix_acl_release(acl);
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
ret = __posix_acl_chmod(&acl, GFP_KERNEL, mode);
if (ret)
return ret;
