On 10/09/2020 22:05, Matthew Wilcox wrote: > On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 09:00:10PM +0100, Al Viro wrote: >> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 07:40:33PM +0100, Matthew Wilcox wrote: >>> On Thu, Sep 10, 2020 at 08:38:21PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >>>> There is also the use case of noexec mounts and file permissions. From >>>> user space point of view, it doesn't matter which kernel component is in >>>> charge of defining the policy. The syscall should then not be tied with >>>> a verification/integrity/signature/appraisal vocabulary, but simply an >>>> access control one. >>> >>> permission()? >> >> int lsm(int fd, const char *how, char *error, int size); >> >> Seriously, this is "ask LSM to apply special policy to file"; let's >> _not_ mess with flags, etc. for that; give it decent bandwidth >> and since it's completely opaque for the rest of the kernel, >> just a pass a string to be parsed by LSM as it sees fit. Well, I don't know why you're so angry against LSM, but as noticed by Matthew, the main focus of this patch series is not about LSM (no hook, no security/* code, only file permission and mount option checks, nothing fancy). Moreover, the syscall you're proposing doesn't make sense, but I guess it's yet another sarcastic reply. Please, cool down. We asked for constructive comments and already followed your previous requests (even if we didn't get answers for some questions), but seriously, this one is nonsense. > > Hang on, it does have some things which aren't BD^W^WLSM. It lets > the interpreter honour the mount -o noexec option. I presume it's > not easily defeated by > cat /home/salaun/bin/bad.pl | perl - > Funny. I know there is a lot of text and links but please read the commit messages before further comments.
