> On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 04:49:53PM +0200, Adrian Reber wrote: > > From: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > Allow CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable users to change /proc/self/exe. > > > > This commit also changes the permission error code from -EINVAL to > > -EPERM for consistency with the rest of the prctl() syscall when > > checking capabilities. > I agree that EINVAL seems weird here but this is a potentially user visible change. Might be nice to have the EINVAL->EPERM change be an additional patch on top after this one so we can revert it in case it breaks someone (unlikely though). I can split this out myself though so no need to resend for that alone. > What I would also prefer is to have some history in the commit message tbh. The reason is that when we started discussing that specific change I had to hunt down the history of changing /proc/self/exe and had to dig up and read through ancient threads on lore to come up with the explanation why this is placed under a capability. The commit message should then also mention that there are other ways to change the /proc/self/exe link that don't require capabilities and that /proc/self/exe itself is not something userspace should rely on for security. Mainly so that in a few months/years we can read through that commit message and go "Weird, but ok.". :) > But maybe I can just rewrite this myself so you don't have to go through the trouble. This is really not pedantry it's just that it's a lot of work digging up the reasons for a piece of code existing when it's really not obvious. :) Hello Christian, I agree. Thank you for suggesting doing the work, but you've done plenty already. So we'll come back to you with: 1) A separate commit for EINVAL->EPERM 2) A full history of discussions in the commit message related to /proc/self/exe capability check Thanks, Nico
