On 2020/06/26 14:41, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>> I was hoping that fork_usermode_blob() accepts only simple program
>> like the content of "hello64" generated by
>
> pretty much. statically compiled elf that is self contained.
But fork_usermode_blob() itself does not check that.
>> due to interference from the rest of the system, how can we say "we trust kernel
>> code executing in userspace" ?
>
> I answered this already in the previous email.
Previous post is mostly summary for David Miller who responded
It's kernel code executing in userspace. If you don't trust the
signed code you don't trust the signed code.
Nothing is magic about a piece of code executing in userspace.
without understanding my concerns.
> Use security_ptrace_access_check() LSM hook to make sure that no other process
> can tamper with blob's memory when it's running as user process.
Yes, security_ptrace_access_check() hook is there. But see the reality explained later.
> In the future it would be trivial to add a new ptrace flag to
> make sure that blob's memory is not ptraceable from the start.
I guess it is some PF_* flag (like PF_KTHREAD is used for avoiding some interference).
>> There is security_ptrace_access_check() LSM hook, but no zero-configuration
>> method is available.
>
> huh?
> tomoyo is not using that hook, but selinux and many other LSMs do.
> please learn from others.
What I am hoping is that we can restrict interference between usermode blob processes
and other processes without using LSMs, for the reality is
(1) Linux kernel community does not allow legally accessing LSM infrastructure from
loadable kernel modules since Linux 2.6.24.
(2) Red Hat folks enable only SELinux in their kernels.
(3) Customers I'm working for cannot afford enabling SELinux in their environments.
and therefore
(4) I have to maintain loadable kernel module version of LSM modules which illegally
access LSM infrastructure in order to implement single function LSM modules.
Implementing security_ptrace_access_check() hook in TOMOYO is not a solution.
>>> security label can carry that execution context.
>>
>> If files get a chance to be associated with appropriate pathname and
>> security label.
>
> I can easily add a fake pathname to the blob, but it won't help tomoyo.
> That's what I was saying all along.
> pathname based security provides false sense of security.
>
> I'm pretty sure this old blog has been read by many folks who
> are following this thread, but it's worth reminding again:
> https://securityblog.org/2006/04/19/security-anti-pattern-path-based-access-control/
> I cannot agree more with Joshua.
> Here is a quote:
> "The most obvious problem with this is that not all objects are files and thus do not have paths."
Don't you know that TOMOYO can coexist with SELinux/Smack/AppArmor since Linux 5.1 ? ;-)
