On 2020-05-13 11:53 a.m., Scott Branden wrote:
Hi Mimi,
On 2020-05-13 11:39 a.m., Mimi Zohar wrote:
[Cc'ing linux-security-module, linux-integrity]
On Thu, 2020-05-07 at 17:27 -0700, Scott Branden wrote:
Add kernel_pread_file* support to kernel to allow for partial read
of files with an offset into the file. Existing kernel_read_file
functions call new kernel_pread_file functions with offset=0 and
flags=KERNEL_PREAD_FLAG_WHOLE.
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
<snip>
@@ -941,14 +955,16 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void
**buf, loff_t *size,
The checkpatch shows this as kernel_read_file when it is actually the
new function kernel_pread_file.
typo: "checkpatch" should be "patch diff"
Please see the call to kernel_pread_file from kernel_read_file in the
complete patch rather this snippet.
if (bytes == 0)
break;
+
+ buf_pos += bytes;
}
- if (pos != i_size) {
+ if (pos != read_end) {
ret = -EIO;
goto out_free;
}
- ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
+ ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, alloc_size, id);
if (!ret)
*size = pos;
Prior to the patch set that introduced this security hook, firmware
would be read twice, once for measuring/appraising the firmware and
again reading the file contents into memory. Partial reads will break
both IMA's measuring the file and appraising the file signatures.
The partial file read support is needed for request_firmware_into_buf
from drivers. The EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL is being removed so that
there can be no abuse of the partial file read support. Such file
integrity checks are not needed for this use case. The partial file
(firmware image) is actually downloaded in portions and verified on
the device it is loaded to.
Regards,
Scott
