Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> On Wed, Apr 15, 2020 at 01:28:24PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> syzbot writes:
>> > KASAN: use-after-free Read in dput (2)
>> >
>> > proc_fill_super: allocate dentry failed
>> > ==================================================================
>> > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in fast_dput fs/dcache.c:727 [inline]
>> > BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dput+0x53e/0xdf0 fs/dcache.c:846
>> > Read of size 4 at addr ffff88808a618cf0 by task syz-executor.0/8426
>> >
>> > CPU: 0 PID: 8426 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.0-next-20200412-syzkaller #0
>> > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
>> > Call Trace:
>> > __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
>> > dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118
>> > print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd3/0x315 mm/kasan/report.c:382
>> > __kasan_report.cold+0x35/0x4d mm/kasan/report.c:511
>> > kasan_report+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:625
>> > fast_dput fs/dcache.c:727 [inline]
>> > dput+0x53e/0xdf0 fs/dcache.c:846
>> > proc_kill_sb+0x73/0xf0 fs/proc/root.c:195
>> > deactivate_locked_super+0x8c/0xf0 fs/super.c:335
>> > vfs_get_super+0x258/0x2d0 fs/super.c:1212
>> > vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1547
>> > do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2813 [inline]
>> > do_mount+0x1306/0x1b30 fs/namespace.c:3138
>> > __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3347 [inline]
>> > __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3324 [inline]
>> > __x64_sys_mount+0x18f/0x230 fs/namespace.c:3324
>> > do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
>> > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
>> > RIP: 0033:0x45c889
>> > Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
>> > RSP: 002b:00007ffc1930ec48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
>> > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000001324914 RCX: 000000000045c889
>> > RDX: 0000000020000140 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000000
>> > RBP: 000000000076bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>> > R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
>> > R13: 0000000000000749 R14: 00000000004ca15a R15: 0000000000000013
>>
>> Looking at the code now that it the internal mount of proc is no
>> longer used it is possible to unmount proc. If proc is unmounted
>> the fields of the pid namespace that were used for filesystem
>> specific state are not reinitialized.
>>
>> Which means that proc_self and proc_thread_self can be pointers to
>> already freed dentries.
>>
>> The reported user after free appears to be from mounting and
>> unmounting proc followed by mounting proc again and using error
>> injection to cause the new root dentry allocation to fail. This in
>> turn results in proc_kill_sb running with proc_self and
>> proc_thread_self still retaining their values from the previous mount
>> of proc. Then calling dput on either proc_self of proc_thread_self
>> will result in double put. Which KASAN sees as a use after free.
>>
>> Solve this by always reinitializing the filesystem state stored
>> in the struct pid_namespace, when proc is unmounted.
>>
>> Reported-by: syzbot+72868dd424eb66c6b95f@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> Fixes: 69879c01a0c3 ("proc: Remove the now unnecessary internal mount of proc")
>> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Was looking at that earlier right before eod briefly here as well.
> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
The syzbot report or did you see the failure another way?
Eric
