On Tue, Jan 21, 2020 at 04:30:15PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 20, 2020 at 02:31:59PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> > If userspace provides an invalid fscrypt no-key filename which encodes a
> > hash value with any of the UBIFS node type bits set (i.e. the high 3
> > bits), gracefully report ENOENT rather than triggering ubifs_assert().
> >
> > Test case with kvm-xfstests shell:
> >
> > . fs/ubifs/config
> > . ~/xfstests/common/encrypt
> > dev=$(__blkdev_to_ubi_volume /dev/vdc)
> > ubiupdatevol $dev -t
> > mount $dev /mnt -t ubifs
> > mkdir /mnt/edir
> > xfs_io -c set_encpolicy /mnt/edir
> > rm /mnt/edir/_,,,,,DAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
> >
> > With the bug, the following assertion fails on the 'rm' command:
> >
> > [ 19.066048] UBIFS error (ubi0:0 pid 379): ubifs_assert_failed: UBIFS assert failed: !(hash & ~UBIFS_S_KEY_HASH_MASK), in fs/ubifs/key.h:170
> >
> > Fixes: f4f61d2cc6d8 ("ubifs: Implement encrypted filenames")
> > Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> # v4.10+
> > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> Richard, can you review the two UBIFS patches in this series, and if you're okay
> with them, provide Acked-by's so that we can take them through the fscrypt tree?
> They don't conflict with anything currently in the UBIFS tree.
>
Richard, any objection to us taking these patches through the fscrypt tree?
- Eric
