From: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@xxxxxxxxxx>
When we allow indexed directories to use both encryption and
casefolding, for the dirhash we can't just hash the ciphertext filenames
that are stored on-disk (as is done currently) because the dirhash must
be case insensitive, but the stored names are case-preserving. Nor can
we hash the plaintext names with an unkeyed hash (or a hash keyed with a
value stored on-disk like ext4's s_hash_seed), since that would leak
information about the names that encryption is meant to protect.
Instead, if we can accept a dirhash that's only computable when the
fscrypt key is available, we can hash the plaintext names with a keyed
hash using a secret key derived from the directory's fscrypt master key.
We'll use SipHash-2-4 for this purpose.
Prepare for this by deriving a SipHash key for each casefolded encrypted
directory. Make sure to handle deriving the key not only when setting
up the directory's fscrypt_info, but also in the case where the casefold
flag is enabled after the fscrypt_info was already set up. (We could
just always derive the key regardless of casefolding, but that would
introduce unnecessary overhead for people not using casefolding.)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@xxxxxxxxxx>
[EB: improved commit message, updated fscrypt.rst, squashed with change
that avoids unnecessarily deriving the key, and many other cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 10 +++++
fs/crypto/fname.c | 21 +++++++++++
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 13 +++++++
fs/crypto/hooks.c | 16 ++++++++
fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
include/linux/fscrypt.h | 9 +++++
6 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
index 380a1be9550e1..c45f5bcc13e17 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
@@ -302,6 +302,16 @@ For master keys used for v2 encryption policies, a unique 16-byte "key
identifier" is also derived using the KDF. This value is stored in
the clear, since it is needed to reliably identify the key itself.
+Dirhash keys
+------------
+
+For directories that are indexed using a secret-keyed dirhash over the
+plaintext filenames, the KDF is also used to derive a 128-bit
+SipHash-2-4 key per directory in order to hash filenames. This works
+just like deriving a per-file encryption key, except that a different
+KDF context is used. Currently, only casefolded ("case-insensitive")
+encrypted directories use this style of hashing.
+
Encryption modes and usage
==========================
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c
index 3fd27e14ebdd6..2d0d5a934e170 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fname.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c
@@ -402,6 +402,27 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_setup_filename);
+/**
+ * fscrypt_fname_siphash() - calculate the SipHash of a filename
+ * @dir: the parent directory
+ * @name: the filename to calculate the SipHash of
+ *
+ * Given a plaintext filename @name and a directory @dir which uses SipHash as
+ * its dirhash method and has had its fscrypt key set up, this function
+ * calculates the SipHash of that name using the directory's secret dirhash key.
+ *
+ * Return: the SipHash of @name using the hash key of @dir
+ */
+u64 fscrypt_fname_siphash(const struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name)
+{
+ const struct fscrypt_info *ci = dir->i_crypt_info;
+
+ WARN_ON(!ci->ci_dirhash_key_initialized);
+
+ return siphash(name->name, name->len, &ci->ci_dirhash_key);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_fname_siphash);
+
/*
* Validate dentries in encrypted directories to make sure we aren't potentially
* caching stale dentries after a key has been added.
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index b22e8decebedd..d4e650086edc6 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#define _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H
#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#define CONST_STRLEN(str) (sizeof(str) - 1)
@@ -188,6 +189,14 @@ struct fscrypt_info {
*/
struct fscrypt_direct_key *ci_direct_key;
+ /*
+ * This inode's hash key for filenames. This is a 128-bit SipHash-2-4
+ * key. This is only set for directories that use a keyed dirhash over
+ * the plaintext filenames -- currently just casefolded directories.
+ */
+ siphash_key_t ci_dirhash_key;
+ bool ci_dirhash_key_initialized;
+
/* The encryption policy used by this inode */
union fscrypt_policy ci_policy;
@@ -262,6 +271,7 @@ extern int fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, const u8 *master_key,
#define HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_FILE_KEY 2
#define HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY 3
#define HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY 4
+#define HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRHASH_KEY 5
extern int fscrypt_hkdf_expand(const struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, u8 context,
const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen,
@@ -433,6 +443,9 @@ fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(struct fscrypt_mode *mode, const u8 *raw_key,
extern int fscrypt_set_derived_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
const u8 *derived_key);
+extern int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
+ struct fscrypt_info *ci);
+
/* keysetup_v1.c */
extern void fscrypt_put_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key *dk);
diff --git a/fs/crypto/hooks.c b/fs/crypto/hooks.c
index d96a58f11d2b0..bbb31dca0311e 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/hooks.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/hooks.c
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
* Encryption hooks for higher-level filesystem operations.
*/
+#include <linux/key.h>
+
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
/**
@@ -137,8 +139,14 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode,
unsigned int oldflags, unsigned int flags)
{
struct fscrypt_info *ci;
+ struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
int err;
+ /*
+ * When the CASEFOLD flag is set on an encrypted directory, we must
+ * derive the secret key needed for the dirhash. This is only possible
+ * if the directory uses a v2 encryption policy.
+ */
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && (flags & ~oldflags & FS_CASEFOLD_FL)) {
err = fscrypt_require_key(inode);
if (err)
@@ -146,6 +154,14 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode,
ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
if (ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2)
return -EINVAL;
+ mk = ci->ci_master_key->payload.data[0];
+ down_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem);
+ if (is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret))
+ err = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(mk, ci);
+ else
+ err = -ENOKEY;
+ up_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem);
+ return err;
}
return 0;
}
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
index 96074054bdbc8..31c26ca75f43c 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
@@ -174,10 +174,24 @@ static int setup_per_mode_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
return 0;
}
+int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
+ struct fscrypt_info *ci)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRHASH_KEY,
+ ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE,
+ (u8 *)&ci->ci_dirhash_key,
+ sizeof(ci->ci_dirhash_key));
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ ci->ci_dirhash_key_initialized = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
- u8 derived_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
int err;
if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) {
@@ -189,8 +203,8 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
* This ensures that the master key is consistently used only
* for HKDF, avoiding key reuse issues.
*/
- return setup_per_mode_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_direct_tfms,
- HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY, false);
+ err = setup_per_mode_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_direct_tfms,
+ HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY, false);
} else if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags &
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64) {
/*
@@ -199,21 +213,33 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
* the IVs. This format is optimized for use with inline
* encryption hardware compliant with the UFS or eMMC standards.
*/
- return setup_per_mode_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_tfms,
- HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY,
- true);
+ err = setup_per_mode_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_tfms,
+ HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY, true);
+ } else {
+ u8 derived_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+
+ err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf,
+ HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_FILE_KEY,
+ ci->ci_nonce,
+ FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE,
+ derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = fscrypt_set_derived_key(ci, derived_key);
+ memzero_explicit(derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
}
-
- err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf,
- HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_FILE_KEY,
- ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE,
- derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
if (err)
return err;
- err = fscrypt_set_derived_key(ci, derived_key);
- memzero_explicit(derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
- return err;
+ /* Derive a secret dirhash key for directories that need it. */
+ if (S_ISDIR(ci->ci_inode->i_mode) && IS_CASEFOLDED(ci->ci_inode)) {
+ err = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(mk, ci);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
index 3984eadd7023f..2bb43a772f361 100644
--- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h
+++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ extern int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(const struct inode *inode,
u32 hash, u32 minor_hash,
const struct fscrypt_str *iname,
struct fscrypt_str *oname);
+extern u64 fscrypt_fname_siphash(const struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *name);
#define FSCRYPT_FNAME_MAX_UNDIGESTED_SIZE 32
@@ -479,6 +481,13 @@ static inline bool fscrypt_match_name(const struct fscrypt_name *fname,
return !memcmp(de_name, fname->disk_name.name, fname->disk_name.len);
}
+static inline u64 fscrypt_fname_siphash(const struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *name)
+{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* bio.c */
static inline void fscrypt_decrypt_bio(struct bio *bio)
{
--
2.25.0
