On Thu, Dec 26, 2019 at 06:03:36PM +0000, Sargun Dhillon wrote: > This syscall allows for the retrieval of file descriptors from other > processes, based on their pidfd. This is possible using ptrace, and > injection of parasitic code to inject code which leverages SCM_RIGHTS > to move file descriptors between a tracee and a tracer. Unfortunately, > ptrace comes with a high cost of requiring the process to be stopped, > and breaks debuggers. This does not require stopping the process under > manipulation. > > One reason to use this is to allow sandboxers to take actions on file > descriptors on the behalf of another process. For example, this can be > combined with seccomp-bpf's user notification to do on-demand fd > extraction and take privileged actions. One such privileged action > is binding a socket to a privileged port. > > This also adds the syscall to all architectures at the same time. > > /* prototype */ > /* flags is currently reserved and should be set to 0 */ > int sys_pidfd_getfd(int pidfd, int fd, unsigned int flags); > > /* testing */ > Ran self-test suite on x86_64 Fyi, I'm likely going to rewrite/add parts of/to this once I apply. A few comments below. > diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c > index 2278e249141d..4a551f947869 100644 > --- a/kernel/pid.c > +++ b/kernel/pid.c > @@ -578,3 +578,106 @@ void __init pid_idr_init(void) > init_pid_ns.pid_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(pid, > SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_ACCOUNT); > } > + > +static struct file *__pidfd_fget(struct task_struct *task, int fd) > +{ > + struct file *file; > + int ret; > + > + ret = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); > + if (ret) > + return ERR_PTR(ret); > + > + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS)) { > + file = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); > + goto out; > + } > + > + file = fget_task(task, fd); > + if (!file) > + file = ERR_PTR(-EBADF); > + > +out: > + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); > + return file; > +} Looking at this code now a bit closer, ptrace_may_access() and fget_task() both take task_lock(task) so this currently does: task_lock(); /* check access */ task_unlock(); task_lock(); /* get fd */ task_unlock(); which doesn't seem great. I would prefer if we could do: task_lock(); /* check access */ /* get fd */ task_unlock(); But ptrace_may_access() doesn't export an unlocked variant so _shrug_. But we can write this a little cleaner without the goto as: static struct file *__pidfd_fget(struct task_struct *task, int fd) { struct file *file; int ret; ret = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); if (ret) return ERR_PTR(ret); if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS)) file = fget_task(task, fd); else file = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); return file ?: ERR_PTR(-EBADF); } If you don't like the ?: just do: if (!file) return ERR_PTR(-EBADF); return file; though I prefer the shorter ?: syntax which is perfect for shortcutting returns. > + > +static int pidfd_getfd(struct pid *pid, int fd) > +{ > + struct task_struct *task; > + struct file *file; > + int ret, retfd; > + > + task = get_pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID); > + if (!task) > + return -ESRCH; > + > + file = __pidfd_fget(task, fd); > + put_task_struct(task); > + if (IS_ERR(file)) > + return PTR_ERR(file); > + > + retfd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC); > + if (retfd < 0) { > + ret = retfd; > + goto out; > + } > + > + /* > + * security_file_receive must come last since it may have side effects > + * and cannot be reversed. > + */ > + ret = security_file_receive(file); So I don't understand the comment here. Can you explain what the side effects are? security_file_receive() is called in two places: net/core/scm.c and net/compat.c. In both places it is called _before_ get_unused_fd_flags() so I don't know what's special here that would prevent us from doing the same. If there's no actual reason, please rewrite this functions as: static int pidfd_getfd(struct pid *pid, int fd) { int ret; struct task_struct *task; struct file *file; task = get_pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID); if (!task) return -ESRCH; file = __pidfd_fget(task, fd); put_task_struct(task); if (IS_ERR(file)) return PTR_ERR(file); ret = security_file_receive(file); if (ret) { fput(file); return ret; } ret = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC); if (ret < 0) fput(file); else fd_install(ret, file); return ret; }