Hello, TLDR; I see a lot of benefit to switching away from procfs for setting auid & sessionid. On Wednesday, October 30, 2019 6:03:20 PM EDT Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > Also, for the record, removing the audit loginuid from procfs is not > > something to take lightly, if at all; like it or not, it's part of the > > kernel API. It can also be used by tools to iterate processes related to one user or session. I use this in my Intrusion Prevention System which will land in audit user space at some point in the future. > Oh, I'm quite aware of how important this change is and it was discussed > with Steve Grubb who saw the concern and value of considering such a > disruptive change. Actually, I advocated for syscall. I think the gist of Eric's idea was that / proc is the intersection of many nasty problems. By relying on it, you can't simplify the API to reduce the complexity. Almost no program actually needs access to /proc. ps does. But almost everything else is happy without it. For example, when you setup chroot jails, you may have to add /dev/random or / dev/null, but almost never /proc. What does force you to add /proc is any entry point daemon like sshd because it needs to set the loginuid. If we switch away from /proc, then sshd or crond will no longer /require/ procfs to be available which again simplifies the system design. > Removing proc support for auid/ses would be a > long-term deprecation if accepted. It might need to just be turned into readonly for a while. But then again, perhaps auid and session should be part of /proc/<pid>/status? Maybe this can be done independently and ahead of the container work so there is a migration path for things that read auid or session. TBH, maybe this should have been done from the beginning. -Steve
