On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 05:50:40PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 05:31:35PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > > On Sat, Aug 10, 2019 at 07:45:59AM +0800, Gao Xiang wrote: > > > Hi Willy, > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 01:45:17PM -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote: > > > > On Wed, Aug 07, 2019 at 10:49:36PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Aug 08, 2019 at 12:26:42PM +0800, Gao Xiang wrote: > > > > > > 1. decrypt->verity->decompress > > > > > > > > > > > > 2. verity->decompress->decrypt > > > > > > > > > > > > 3. decompress->decrypt->verity > > > > > > > > > > > > 1. and 2. could cause less computation since it processes > > > > > > compressed data, and the security is good enough since > > > > > > the behavior of decompression algorithm is deterministic. > > > > > > 3 could cause more computation. > > > > > > > > > > > > All I want to say is the post process is so complicated since we have > > > > > > many selection if encryption, decompression, verification are all involved. > > > > > > > > > > > > Maybe introduce a core subset to IOMAP is better for long-term > > > > > > maintainment and better performance. And we should consider it > > > > > > more carefully. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > FWIW, the only order that actually makes sense is decrypt->decompress->verity. > > > > > > > > That used to be true, but a paper in 2004 suggested it's not true. > > > > Further work in this space in 2009 based on block ciphers: > > > > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1009.1759 > > > > > > > > It looks like it'd be computationally expensive to do, but feasible. > > > > > > Yes, maybe someone cares where encrypt is at due to their system design. > > > > > > and I thought over these days, I have to repeat my thought of verity > > > again :( the meaningful order ought to be "decrypt->verity->decompress" > > > rather than "decrypt->decompress->verity" if compression is involved. > > > > > > since most (de)compress algorithms are complex enough (allocate memory and > > > do a lot of unsafe stuffes such as wildcopy) and even maybe unsafe by its > > > design, we cannot do verity in the end for security consideration thus > > > the whole system can be vulnerable by this order from malformed on-disk > > > data. In other words, we need to verify on compressed data. > > > > > > Fsverity is fine for me since most decrypt algorithms is stable and reliable > > > and no compression by its design, but if some decrypt software algorithms is > > > complicated enough, I'd suggest "verity->decrypt" as well to some extent. > > > > > > Considering transformation "A->B->C->D->....->verity", if any of "A->B->C > > > ->D->..." is attacked by the malformed on-disk data... It would crash or > > > even root the whole operating system. > > > > > > All in all, we have to verify data earlier in order to get trusted data > > > for later complex transformation chains. > > > > > > The performance benefit I described in my previous email, it seems no need > > > to say again... please take them into consideration and I think it's no > > > easy to get a unique generic post-read order for all real systems. > > > > > > > While it would be nice to protect against filesystem bugs, it's not the point of > > fs-verity. fs-verity is about authenticating the contents the *user* sees, so > > that e.g. a file can be distributed to many computers and it can be > > authenticated regardless of exactly what other filesystem features were used > > when it was stored on disk. Different computers may use: > > > > - Different filesystems > > - Different compression algorithms (or no compression) > > - Different compression strengths, even with same algorithm > > - Different divisions of the file into compression units > > - Different encryption algorithms (or no encryption) > > - Different encryption keys, even with same algorithm > > - Different encryption nonces, even with same key > > > > All those change the on-disk data; only the user-visible data stays the same. > > > > Bugs in filesystems may also be exploited regardless of fs-verity, as the > > attacker (able to manipulate on-disk image) can create a malicious file without > > fs-verity enabled, somewhere else on the filesystem. > > > > If you actually want to authenticate the full filesystem image, you need to use > > dm-verity, which is designed for that. > > > > Also keep in mind that ideally the encryption layer would do authenticated > encryption, so that during decrypt->decompress->verity the blocks only get past > the decrypt step if they're authentically from someone with the encryption key. > That's currently missing from fscrypt for practical reasons (read/write > per-block metadata is really hard on most filesystems), but in an ideal world it > would be there. The fs-verity step is conceptually different, but it seems it's > being conflated with this missing step. Yes, but encryption could be not enabled mandatorily for all the post-read data, and not all encrypt algorithms are authenticated encryption...blah-blah-blah... I want to stop here :) and I think it depends on real requirements, and I don't want the geneeric post-read process is too limited by specfic chains.... Thanks, Gao XIang > > - Eric
