On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 8:52 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 2019-07-16 19:30, Paul Moore wrote: ... > > We can trust capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) for enforcing audit container > > ID policy, we can not trust ns_capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL). > > Ok. So does a process in a non-init user namespace have two (or more) > sets of capabilities stored in creds, one in the init_user_ns, and one > in current_user_ns? Or does it get stripped of all its capabilities in > init_user_ns once it has its own set in current_user_ns? If the former, > then we can use capable(). If the latter, we need another mechanism, as > you have suggested might be needed. Unfortunately I think the problem is that ultimately we need to allow any container orchestrator that has been given privileges to manage the audit container ID to also grant that privilege to any of the child process/containers it manages. I don't believe we can do that with capabilities based on the code I've looked at, and the discussions I've had, but if you find a way I would leave to hear it. > If some random unprivileged user wants to fire up a container > orchestrator/engine in his own user namespace, then audit needs to be > namespaced. Can we safely discard this scenario for now? I think the only time we want to allow a container orchestrator to manage the audit container ID is if it has been granted that privilege by someone who has that privilege already. In the zero-container, or single-level of containers, case this is relatively easy, and we can accomplish it using CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL as the privilege. If we start nesting container orchestrators it becomes more complicated as we need to be able to support granting and inheriting this privilege in a manner; this is why I suggested a new mechanism *may* be necessary. -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com
