Re: [PATCH v4 00/16] fs-verity: read-only file-based authenticity protection

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On Thu, Jun 6, 2019 at 8:54 AM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> This is a redesigned version of the fs-verity patchset, implementing
> Ted's suggestion to build the Merkle tree in the kernel
> (https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20190207031101.GA7387@xxxxxxx/).
> This greatly simplifies the UAPI, since the verity metadata no longer
> needs to be transferred to the kernel.

Interfaces look sane to me. My only real concern is whether it would
make sense to make the FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl be something that
could be done incrementally, since the way it is done now it looks
like any random user could create a big file and then do the
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY to make the kernel do a _very_ expensive
operation.

Yes, I see the

+               if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
+                       return -EINTR;
+               cond_resched();

in there, so it's not like it's some entirely unkillable thing, and
maybe we don't care as a result. But maybe the ioctl interface could
be fundamentally restartable?

If that was already considered and people just went "too complex", never mind.

               Linus



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