In message <20080424142857.GF15214@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Al Viro writes: > On Thu, Apr 24, 2008 at 04:09:18PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote: [...] > FWIW, I'm not all that happy about the way ecryptfs_interpose() is done, > while we are at it. We get the sucker opened by whoever steps on given > place in the tree first, with subsequent operations done using the resulting > struct file. With fallback to r/o open. What happens to somebody who > tries to open it with enough permissions to do r/w? Yes, ecryptfs_interpose() calls ecryptfs_init_persistent_file() which calls dentry_open(O_RDWR). What's the proposed solution for this in the face of r/o vfsmounts? How could ecryptfs avoid calling this dentry_open in the first place? For unionfs, all I need is return -EROFS or the like to trigger a possible copyup. Erez. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
