On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 7:35 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Audit events could happen in a network namespace outside of a task > context due to packets received from the net that trigger an auditing > rule prior to being associated with a running task. The network > namespace could be in use by multiple containers by association to the > tasks in that network namespace. We still want a way to attribute > these events to any potential containers. Keep a list per network > namespace to track these audit container identifiiers. > > Add/increment the audit container identifier on: > - initial setting of the audit container identifier via /proc > - clone/fork call that inherits an audit container identifier > - unshare call that inherits an audit container identifier > - setns call that inherits an audit container identifier > Delete/decrement the audit container identifier on: > - an inherited audit container identifier dropped when child set > - process exit > - unshare call that drops a net namespace > - setns call that drops a net namespace > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/92 > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64 > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > include/linux/audit.h | 19 ++++++++++++ > kernel/audit.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 +++ > 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > index fa19fa408931..70255c2dfb9f 100644 > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ > #include <linux/ptrace.h> > #include <linux/namei.h> /* LOOKUP_* */ > #include <uapi/linux/audit.h> > +#include <linux/refcount.h> > > #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1) > #define AUDIT_DEV_UNSET ((dev_t)-1) > @@ -99,6 +100,13 @@ struct audit_task_info { > > extern struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit; > > +struct audit_contid { > + struct list_head list; > + u64 id; > + refcount_t refcount; Hm, since we only ever touch the refcount under a spinlock, I wonder if we could just make it a regular unsigned int (we don't need the atomicity guarantees). OTOH, refcount_t comes with some extra overflow checking, so it's probably better to leave it as is... > + struct rcu_head rcu; > +}; > + > extern int is_audit_feature_set(int which); > > extern int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list); > @@ -202,6 +210,10 @@ static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > } > > extern void audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, u64 contid); > +extern void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid); > +extern void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid); > +extern void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, > + struct task_struct *p); > > extern u32 audit_enabled; > #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ > @@ -271,6 +283,13 @@ static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > > static inline void audit_log_contid(struct audit_context *context, u64 contid) > { } > +static inline void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid) > +{ } > +static inline void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) > +{ } > +static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, > + struct task_struct *p) > +{ } > > #define audit_enabled AUDIT_OFF > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index cf448599ef34..7fa3194f5342 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ > #include <linux/freezer.h> > #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> > #include <net/netns/generic.h> > +#include <net/net_namespace.h> > > #include "audit.h" > > @@ -99,9 +100,13 @@ > /** > * struct audit_net - audit private network namespace data > * @sk: communication socket > + * @contid_list: audit container identifier list > + * @contid_list_lock audit container identifier list lock > */ > struct audit_net { > struct sock *sk; > + struct list_head contid_list; > + spinlock_t contid_list_lock; > }; > > /** > @@ -275,8 +280,11 @@ struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { > void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) > { > struct audit_task_info *info = tsk->audit; > + struct nsproxy *ns = tsk->nsproxy; > > audit_free_syscall(tsk); > + if (ns) > + audit_netns_contid_del(ns->net_ns, audit_get_contid(tsk)); > /* Freeing the audit_task_info struct must be performed after > * audit_log_exit() due to need for loginuid and sessionid. > */ > @@ -376,6 +384,73 @@ static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net) > return aunet->sk; > } > > +void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid) > +{ > + struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); > + struct list_head *contid_list = &aunet->contid_list; > + struct audit_contid *cont; > + > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > + return; > + if (!aunet) > + return; > + spin_lock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > + if (!list_empty(contid_list)) > + list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, contid_list, list) > + if (cont->id == contid) { > + refcount_inc(&cont->refcount); > + goto out; > + } > + cont = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_contid), GFP_ATOMIC); > + if (cont) { > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cont->list); > + cont->id = contid; > + refcount_set(&cont->refcount, 1); > + list_add_rcu(&cont->list, contid_list); > + } > +out: > + spin_unlock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > +} > + > +void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) > +{ > + struct audit_net *aunet; > + struct list_head *contid_list; > + struct audit_contid *cont = NULL; > + > + if (!net) > + return; > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > + return; > + aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); > + if (!aunet) > + return; > + contid_list = &aunet->contid_list; > + spin_lock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > + if (!list_empty(contid_list)) > + list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, contid_list, list) > + if (cont->id == contid) { > + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&cont->refcount)) { > + list_del_rcu(&cont->list); > + kfree_rcu(cont, rcu); > + } > + break; > + } > + spin_unlock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > +} > + > +void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p) > +{ > + u64 contid = audit_get_contid(p); > + struct nsproxy *new = p->nsproxy; > + > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > + return; > + audit_netns_contid_del(ns->net_ns, contid); > + if (new) > + audit_netns_contid_add(new->net_ns, contid); > +} > + > void audit_panic(const char *message) > { > switch (audit_failure) { > @@ -1619,7 +1694,6 @@ static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net) > .flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV, > .groups = AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX, > }; > - > struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); > > aunet->sk = netlink_kernel_create(net, NETLINK_AUDIT, &cfg); > @@ -1628,7 +1702,8 @@ static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net) > return -ENOMEM; > } > aunet->sk->sk_sndtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT; > - > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&aunet->contid_list); > + spin_lock_init(&aunet->contid_list_lock); > return 0; > } > > @@ -2380,6 +2455,7 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > uid_t uid; > struct tty_struct *tty; > char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; > + struct net *net = task->nsproxy->net_ns; > > task_lock(task); > /* Can't set if audit disabled */ > @@ -2401,8 +2477,12 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task))) > rc = -EALREADY; > read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); > - if (!rc) > + if (!rc) { > + if (audit_contid_valid(oldcontid)) > + audit_netns_contid_del(net, oldcontid); > task->audit->contid = contid; > + audit_netns_contid_add(net, contid); > + } > task_unlock(task); > > if (!audit_enabled) > diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c > index f6c5d330059a..718b1201ae70 100644 > --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c > +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ > #include <linux/syscalls.h> > #include <linux/cgroup.h> > #include <linux/perf_event.h> > +#include <linux/audit.h> > > static struct kmem_cache *nsproxy_cachep; > > @@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk) > struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy; > struct user_namespace *user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns); > struct nsproxy *new_ns; > + u64 contid = audit_get_contid(tsk); > > if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC | > CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET | > @@ -167,6 +169,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk) > return PTR_ERR(new_ns); > > tsk->nsproxy = new_ns; > + audit_netns_contid_add(new_ns->net_ns, contid); > return 0; > } > > @@ -224,6 +227,7 @@ void switch_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *p, struct nsproxy *new) > ns = p->nsproxy; > p->nsproxy = new; > task_unlock(p); > + audit_switch_task_namespaces(ns, p); Since we call audit_switch_task_namespaces() after task_unlock(), could there be a potential race condition? I'm not going to dive too much into this now, because it's getting late here, but on first look it seems like p->nsproxy could change under our hands before we fetch it in audit_switch_task_namespaces()... > > if (ns && atomic_dec_and_test(&ns->count)) > free_nsproxy(ns); > -- > 1.8.3.1 > -- Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc.
