Omer Tripp's analysis of a Spectre V1 gadget in __close_fd():
"1. __close_fd() is reachable via the close() syscall with a
user-controlled fd.
2. If said bounds check is mispredicted, then a user-controlled
address fdt->fd[fd] is obtained then dereferenced, and the value of
a user-controlled address is loaded into the local variable file.
3. file is then passed as an argument to filp_close, where the cache
lines secret + offsetof(f_op) and secret + offsetof(f_mode) are hot
and vulnerable to a timing channel attack."
Address this by using array_index_nospec() to prevent speculation past
the end of current->fdt.
Reported-by: Omer Tripp <trippo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
v2: include Omer Tripp's analysis in commit message, and update my email
address
fs/file.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/file.c b/fs/file.c
index 7ffd6e9d103d..a80cf82be96b 100644
--- a/fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/file.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
unsigned int sysctl_nr_open __read_mostly = 1024*1024;
unsigned int sysctl_nr_open_min = BITS_PER_LONG;
@@ -626,6 +627,7 @@ int __close_fd(struct files_struct *files, unsigned fd)
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
if (fd >= fdt->max_fds)
goto out_unlock;
+ fd = array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds);
file = fdt->fd[fd];
if (!file)
goto out_unlock;
--
2.19.1
