> > I know there are a few cases, where filesystems call vfs_foo() > > internally, where the vfsmount isn't available, but I think the proper > > solution is just to fix those places, and not recurse back into the > > VFS (which is AFAICS in all those cases totally unnecessary anyway). > > This would make everybody happy, no? > > Apparmor can go play with itself. The proper fix is to lift the LSM nonsense > into callers and leave vfs_...() alone; Maybe. I know precious little about this security thing, so I won't argue about it's merits or faults. But: a) I have a hunch that the security guys wouldn't like to see the order between permission() and security_foo() changed. b) I fail to see how moving functionality to callers would improve things > vfsmounts should *not* be passed there at all, with the exception of > vfs_follow_link() which gets the full nameidata. Why? Miklos -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
