On Wed, Oct 10, 2018 at 2:54 PM Christian Brauner <christian@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 09, 2018 at 06:26:47PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 9, 2018 at 6:20 PM Christian Brauner <christian@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > On Tue, Oct 09, 2018 at 05:26:26PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Oct 9, 2018 at 4:09 PM Christian Brauner <christian@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > > On Tue, Oct 09, 2018 at 03:50:53PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > > > > > On Tue, Oct 9, 2018 at 3:49 PM Christian Brauner <christian@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > > > > On Tue, Oct 09, 2018 at 03:36:04PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> > > > > > > > On Tue, Oct 9, 2018 at 3:29 PM Christian Brauner <christian@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > One more thing. Citing from [1]
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > I think there's a security problem here. Imagine the following scenario:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > 1. task A (uid==0) sets up a seccomp filter that uses SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
> > > > > > > > > > 2. task A forks off a child B
> > > > > > > > > > 3. task B uses setuid(1) to drop its privileges
> > > > > > > > > > 4. task B becomes dumpable again, either via prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1)
> > > > > > > > > > or via execve()
> > > > > > > > > > 5. task C (the attacker, uid==1) attaches to task B via ptrace
> > > > > > > > > > 6. task C uses PTRACE_SECCOMP_NEW_LISTENER on task B
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Sorry, to be late to the party but would this really pass
> > > > > > > > > __ptrace_may_access() in ptrace_attach()? It doesn't seem obvious to me
> > > > > > > > > that it would... Doesn't look like it would get past:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > tcred = __task_cred(task);
> > > > > > > > > if (uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->euid) &&
> > > > > > > > > uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->suid) &&
> > > > > > > > > uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->uid) &&
> > > > > > > > > gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->egid) &&
> > > > > > > > > gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
> > > > > > > > > gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
> > > > > > > > > goto ok;
> > > > > > > > > if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
> > > > > > > > > goto ok;
> > > > > > > > > rcu_read_unlock();
> > > > > > > > > return -EPERM;
> > > > > > > > > ok:
> > > > > > > > > rcu_read_unlock();
> > > > > > > > > mm = task->mm;
> > > > > > > > > if (mm &&
> > > > > > > > > ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
> > > > > > > > > !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
> > > > > > > > > return -EPERM;
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Which specific check would prevent task C from attaching to task B? If
> > > > > > > > the UIDs match, the first "goto ok" executes; and you're dumpable, so
> > > > > > > > you don't trigger the second "return -EPERM".
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > You'd also need CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the mm->user_ns which you shouldn't
> > > > > > > have if you did a setuid to an unpriv user. (But I always find that code
> > > > > > > confusing.)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Only if the target hasn't gone through execve() since setuid().
> > > > >
> > > > > Sorry if I want to know this in excessive detail but I'd like to
> > > > > understand this properly so bear with me :)
> > > > > - If task B has setuid()ed and prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1)ed but not
> > > > > execve()ed then C won't pass ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode).
> > > >
> > > > Yeah.
> > > >
> > > > > - If task B has setuid()ed, exeved()ed it will get its dumpable flag set
> > > > > to /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable
> > > >
> > > > Not if you changed all UIDs (e.g. by calling setuid() as root). In
> > > > that case, setup_new_exec() calls "set_dumpable(current->mm,
> > > > SUID_DUMP_USER)".
> > >
> > > Actually, looking at this when C is trying to PTRACE_ATTACH to B as an
> > > unprivileged user even if B execve()ed and it is dumpable C still
> > > wouldn't have CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the mm->user_ns unless it already is
> > > privileged over mm->user_ns which means it must be in an ancestor
> > > user_ns.
> >
> > Huh? Why would you need CAP_SYS_PTRACE for anything here? You can
> > ptrace another process running under your UID just fine, no matter
> > what the namespaces are. I'm not sure what you're saying.
>
> Sorry, I was out the door yesterday when answering this and was too
> brief. I forgot to mention: /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope. It
> should be enabled by default on nearly all distros
"nearly all distros"? AFAIK it's off on Debian, for starters. And Yama
still doesn't help you if one of the tasks enters a new user namespace
or whatever.
Yama is a little bit of extra, heuristic, **opt-in** hardening enabled
in some configurations. It is **not** a fundamental building block you
can rely on.
> and even if not -
> which is an administrators choice - you can usually easily enable it via
> sysctl.
Opt-in security isn't good enough. Kernel interfaces should still be
safe to use even on a system that has all the LSM stuff disabled in
the kernel config.
> 1 ("restricted ptrace") [default value]
> When performing an operation that requires a PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH check,
> the calling process must either have the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability in
> the user namespace of the target process or it must have a prede‐ fined
> relationship with the target process. By default, the predefined
> relationship is that the target process must be a descendant of the
> caller.
>
> If you don't have it set you're already susceptible to all kinds of
> other attacks
Oh? Can you be more specific, please?
> and I'm still not convinced we need to bring out the big
> capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) gun here.
