On Fri, Oct 5, 2018 at 5:07 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 2018-10-04, Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 4, 2018 at 6:26 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > On 2018-09-29, Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > You attempt to open "C/../../etc/passwd" under the root "/A/B".
> > > > Something else concurrently moves /A/B/C to /A/C. This can result in
> > > > the following:
> > > >
> > > > 1. You start the path walk and reach /A/B/C.
> > > > 2. The other process moves /A/B/C to /A/C. Your path walk is now at /A/C.
> > > > 3. Your path walk follows the first ".." up into /A. This is outside
> > > > the process root, but you never actually encountered the process root,
> > > > so you don't notice.
> > > > 4. Your path walk follows the second ".." up to /. Again, this is
> > > > outside the process root, but you don't notice.
> > > > 5. Your path walk walks down to /etc/passwd, and the open completes
> > > > successfully. You now have an fd pointing outside your chroot.
> > >
> > > I've been playing with this and I have the following patch, which
> > > according to my testing protects against attacks where ".." skips over
> > > nd->root. It abuses __d_path to figure out if nd->path can be resolved
> > > from nd->root (obviously a proper version of this patch would refactor
> > > __d_path so it could be used like this -- and would not return
> > > -EMULTIHOP).
> > >
> > > I've also attached my reproducer. With it, I was seeing fairly constant
> > > breakouts before this patch and after it I didn't see a single breakout
> > > after running it overnight. Obviously this is not conclusive, but I'm
> > > hoping that it can show what my idea for protecting against ".." was.
> > >
> > > Does this patch make sense? Or is there something wrong with it that I'm
> > > not seeing?
> > >
> > > --8<-------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > There is a fairly easy-to-exploit race condition with chroot(2) (and
> > > thus by extension AT_THIS_ROOT and AT_BENEATH) where a rename(2) of a
> > > path can be used to "skip over" nd->root and thus escape to the
> > > filesystem above nd->root.
> > >
> > > thread1 [attacker]:
> > > for (;;)
> > > renameat2(AT_FDCWD, "/a/b/c", AT_FDCWD, "/a/d", RENAME_EXCHANGE);
> > > thread2 [victim]:
> > > for (;;)
> > > openat(dirb, "b/c/../../etc/shadow", O_THISROOT);
> > >
> > > With fairly significant regularity, thread2 will resolve to
> > > "/etc/shadow" rather than "/a/b/etc/shadow". With this patch, such cases
> > > will be detected during ".." resolution (which is the weak point of
> > > chroot(2) -- since walking *into* a subdirectory tautologically cannot
> > > result in you walking *outside* nd->root).
> > >
> > > The use of __d_path here might seem suspect, however we don't mind if a
> > > path is moved from within the chroot to outside the chroot and we
> > > incorrectly decide it is safe (because at that point we are still within
> > > the set of files which were accessible at the beginning of resolution).
> > > However, we can fail resolution on the next path component if it remains
> > > outside of the root. A path which has always been outside nd->root
> > > during resolution will never be resolveable from nd->root and thus will
> > > always be blocked.
> > >
> > > DO NOT MERGE: Currently this code returns -EMULTIHOP in this case,
> > > purely as a debugging measure (so that you can see that
> > > the protection actually does something). Obviously in the
> > > proper patch this will return -EXDEV.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > ---
> > > fs/namei.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > > 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> > > index 6f995e6de6b1..c8349693d47b 100644
> > > --- a/fs/namei.c
> > > +++ b/fs/namei.c
> > > @@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
> > > * The new code replaces the old recursive symlink resolution with
> > > * an iterative one (in case of non-nested symlink chains). It does
> > > * this with calls to <fs>_follow_link().
> > > - * As a side effect, dir_namei(), _namei() and follow_link() are now
> > > - * replaced with a single function lookup_dentry() that can handle all
> > > + * As a side effect, dir_namei(), _namei() and follow_link() are now
> > > + * replaced with a single function lookup_dentry() that can handle all
> > > * the special cases of the former code.
> > > *
> > > * With the new dcache, the pathname is stored at each inode, at least as
> > > @@ -1375,6 +1375,20 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
> > > return -EXDEV;
> > > break;
> > > }
> > > + if (unlikely(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_CHROOT))) {
> > > + char *pathbuf, *pathptr;
> > > +
> > > + pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_ATOMIC);
> > > + if (!pathbuf)
> > > + return -ECHILD;
> > > + pathptr = __d_path(&nd->path, &nd->root, pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
> > > + kfree(pathbuf);
> > > + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pathptr)) {
> > > + if (!pathptr)
> > > + pathptr = ERR_PTR(-EMULTIHOP);
> > > + return PTR_ERR(pathptr);
> > > + }
> > > + }
> >
> > One somewhat problematic thing about this approach is that if someone
> > tries to lookup
> > "a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/[...]/../../../../../../../../../.." for some
> > reason, you'll have quadratic runtime: For each "..", you'll have to
> > walk up to the root.
>
> What if we took rename_lock (call it nd->r_seq) at the start of the
> resolution, and then only tried the __d_path-style check
>
> if (read_seqretry(&rename_lock, nd->r_seq) ||
> read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq))
> /* do the __d_path lookup. */
>
> That way you would only hit the slow path if there were concurrent
> renames or mounts *and* you are doing a path resolution with
> AT_THIS_ROOT or AT_BENEATH. I've attached a modified patch that does
> this (and after some testing it also appears to work).
Yeah, I think that might do the job.
> I'm not sure if there's a way to always avoid the quadratic lookup
> without (significantly and probably unreasonably) changing how dcache
> invalidation works. And obviously using this slow path if there was
> _any_ rename on the _entire_ system is suboptimal, but I think it is a
> significant improvement.
Yeah, I think this is much better.
> Another possibility is to expand on Andy's suggestion to use
> /proc/$pid/root, and instead require AT_THIS_ROOT to use the root of a
> namespace as its dirfd (I'm not sure if there's a trivial way to detect
> this though). This wouldn't help with AT_BENEATH, but it should protect
> against ".." shenanigans without any ".." handling changes. (This is
> less ideal because it requires a container process, but it is another
> way of dealing with the issue.)
(For container usecases, but not for a web server that uses AT_BENEATH.)
> ---
> fs/namei.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index 6f995e6de6b1..12c9be175cb4 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ struct nameidata {
> struct path root;
> struct inode *inode; /* path.dentry.d_inode */
> unsigned int flags;
> - unsigned seq, m_seq;
> + unsigned seq, m_seq, r_seq;
> int last_type;
> unsigned depth;
> int total_link_count;
> @@ -1375,6 +1375,27 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
> return -EXDEV;
> break;
> }
> + if (unlikely((nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_CHROOT)) &&
> + (read_seqretry(&rename_lock, nd->r_seq) ||
> + read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))) {
> + char *pathbuf, *pathptr;
> +
> + nd->r_seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
> + /* Cannot take m_seq here. */
> +
> + pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_ATOMIC);
> + if (!pathbuf)
> + return -ECHILD;
> + pathptr = __d_path(&nd->path, &nd->root, pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
> + kfree(pathbuf);
You're doing this check before actually looking up the parent, right?
So as long as I don't trigger the "path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root)"
check that you do for O_BENEATH, escaping up by one level is possible,
right? You should probably move this check so that it happens after
following "..".
(Also: I assume that you're going to get rid of that memory allocation
in a future version.)
> + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pathptr)) {
> + int error = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(pathptr);
> +
> + if (!error)
> + error = nd_jump_root(nd);
> + return error;
> + }
> + }
> if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
> struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry;
> struct dentry *parent = old->d_parent;
> @@ -1510,6 +1531,27 @@ static int follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd)
> return -EXDEV;
> break;
> }
> + if (unlikely((nd->flags & (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_CHROOT)) &&
> + (read_seqretry(&rename_lock, nd->r_seq) ||
> + read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))) {
> + char *pathbuf, *pathptr;
> +
> + nd->r_seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
> + /* Cannot take m_seq here. */
> +
> + pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!pathbuf)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + pathptr = __d_path(&nd->path, &nd->root, pathbuf, PATH_MAX);
> + kfree(pathbuf);
> + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pathptr)) {
> + int error = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(pathptr);
> +
> + if (!error)
> + error = nd_jump_root(nd);
> + return error;
> + }
> + }
Same problem as in the RCU case above.
> if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
> int ret = path_parent_directory(&nd->path);
> if (ret)
> @@ -2269,6 +2311,9 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
> nd->last_type = LAST_ROOT; /* if there are only slashes... */
> nd->flags = flags | LOOKUP_JUMPED | LOOKUP_PARENT;
> nd->depth = 0;
> + nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
> + nd->r_seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
This means that now, attempting to perform a lookup while something is
holding the rename_lock will spin on the lock. I don't know whether
that's a problem in practice though. Does anyone on this thread know
whether this is problematic?
