On Sat, Sep 22, 2018 at 9:38 AM, Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 9/21/2018 8:02 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 4:59 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> v4: Finer granularity in the patches and other >>> cleanups suggested by Kees Cook. >>> Removed dead code created by the removal of SELinux >>> credential blob poisoning. >> Thanks for the splitting, this really does make it easier to review >> (at least for me). I think this looks really good, though obviously >> I'd like to refactor it slightly on top of my series. :) > > Whichever goes on top is fine with me. What's one > more patch set merge, after all? > >> One additional thought I had was about the blobs allocations: some are >> separate kmem caches, and some are kmalloc. I'm thinking it might make >> sense to use separate kmem caches for two reasons: > > I had seriously considered doing that. I can't see any reason > not to. It's something that could be done at any time, and with > all the other things that had to change it just didn't get in. Yup; that is an easy future change. Not needed now! > >> - they're going to always be the same size and are regularly >> allocated/freed, so it may offer a performance benefit. >> >> - they're explicitly not supposed to be exposed to userspace, so >> hardened usercopy would protect them if they were not kmalloc()ed. >> >> I'm excited about getting this landed! > > Soon. Real soon. I hope. I would very much like for > someone from the SELinux camp to chime in, especially on > the selinux_is_enabled() removal. Agreed. > On a somewhat related note, I will be out for the first three > weeks of October, returning just in time for the Linux Security > Summit in Edinburgh. My connectivity will be severely limited. > I don't expect to accomplish anything while I'm out. If you're okay with it, I can help with changes while you're out -- I want to try to rebase it on my tree and see how it looks anyway. :) -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
