On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> The SELinux specific credential poisioning only makes sense
> if SELinux is managing the credentials. As the intent of this
> patch set is to move the blob management out of the modules
> and into the infrastructure, the SELinux specific code has
> to go. The poisioning could be introduced into the infrastructure
> at some later date.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
-Kees
> ---
> kernel/cred.c | 13 -------------
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ------
> 2 files changed, 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index ecf03657e71c..fa2061ee4955 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -704,19 +704,6 @@ bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
> {
> if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
> return true;
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
> - /*
> - * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
> - * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
> - */
> - if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) {
> - if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
> - return true;
> - if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
> - (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
> - return true;
> - }
> -#endif
> return false;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 9d6cdd21acb6..80614ca25a2b 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3920,12 +3920,6 @@ static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
> {
> struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
>
> - /*
> - * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
> - * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
> - */
> - BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
> - cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
> kfree(tsec);
> }
>
> --
> 2.17.1
>
>
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
