On Tue, Jul 24, 2018 at 3:09 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 2018-07-20 18:13, Paul Moore wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 6, 2018 at 1:00 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a > > > process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID record to document the event. > > > > > > This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of > > > the form /proc/PID/audit_containerid where PID is the process ID of the > > > newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or > > > an additional task added to a container. > > > > > > The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615). > > > > > > The writer must have capability CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. > > > > > > This will produce a record such as this: > > > type=CONTAINER_ID msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yes > > > > > > The "op" field indicates an initial set. The "pid" to "ses" fields are > > > the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process > > > being "contained". Old and new audit container identifier values are > > > given in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success. > > > > > > It is not permitted to unset or re-set the audit container identifier. > > > A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier, but then can > > > be set only once after. > > > > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90 > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51 > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64 > > > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> > > > --- > > > fs/proc/base.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > include/linux/audit.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++ > > > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ > > > kernel/auditsc.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > 4 files changed, 135 insertions(+) ... > > > @@ -2112,6 +2116,73 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) > > > } > > > > > > /** > > > + * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit_context contid > > > + * @contid: contid value > > > + * > > > + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure. > > > + * > > > + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write(). > > > + */ > > > +int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > > > +{ > > > + u64 oldcontid; > > > + int rc = 0; > > > + struct audit_buffer *ab; > > > + uid_t uid; > > > + struct tty_struct *tty; > > > + char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; > > > + > > > + /* Can't set if audit disabled */ > > > + if (!task->audit) > > > + return -ENOPROTOOPT; > > > + oldcontid = audit_get_contid(task); > > > + /* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */ > > > + if (!cid_valid(contid)) > > > + rc = -EINVAL; > > > + /* if we don't have caps, reject */ > > > + else if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) > > > + rc = -EPERM; > > > + /* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */ > > > + else if (!list_empty(&task->children)) > > > + rc = -EBUSY; > > > > Is this safe without holding tasklist_lock? I worry we might be > > vulnerable to a race with fork(). > > > > > + else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task))) > > > + rc = -EALREADY; > > > > Similar concern here as well, although related to threads. > > I think you are correct here and tasklist_lock should cover both. Do we > also want rcu_read_lock() immediately preceeding it? You'll need to take a closer look and determine the locking scheme. I simply took a quick look while reviewing this patch to see what of the existing locks, if any, would be most applicable here; tasklist_lock seemed like a good starting point. It looks like tasklist_lock is defined as a rwlock_t so I'm not sure it would make sense to use it with a RCU protected structure (typically it's RCU+spinlock), but maybe that is the case with a task_struct, you'll need to check. > > > + /* it is already set, and not inherited from the parent, reject */ > > > + else if (cid_valid(oldcontid) && !task->audit->inherited) > > > + rc = -EEXIST; > > > > Maybe I'm missing something, but why do we care about preventing > > reassigning the audit container ID in this case? The task is single > > threaded and has no descendants at this point so it should be safe, > > yes? So long as the task changing the audit container ID has > > capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTOL) it shouldn't matter, right? > > Because we hammered out this idea 6 months ago in the design phase and I > thought we all firmly agreed that the audit container identifier could > only be set once. Has any significant discussion happenned since then > to change that wisdom? I just wonder why this is coming up now. Implementation, and time, can change how one looks at an earlier design. I believe this is why most well reasoned specifications have a reference design. Remind me why the design had the restriction of write once for the audit container ID? At this point given the CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and the single-thread, no-children restrictions I'm not sure what harm there is in allowing the value to be written multiple times (so long as the changes are audited of course). > > Related, I'm questioning if we would ever care if the audit container > > ID was inherited or not? > > We do since that is the only way we can tell if the value has been set > once already or inherited unless we check if the parent's audit > container identifier is identical (which tells us it was inherited). Tied to the above question. If we don't care about multiple changes, given the other constraints, we probably don't need the inherited flag. -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com
