On 04/20/2018 11:35 AM, David Howells wrote: > Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> Adding the SELinux mailing list to the CC line; in the future please >> include the SELinux mailing list on patches like this. It would also >> be very helpful to include "selinux" somewhere in the subject line >> when the patch is predominately SELinux related (much like you did for >> the other LSMs in this patchset). > > I should probably evict the SELinux bits into their own patch since the point > of this patch is the LSM hooks, not specifically SELinux's implementation > thereof. > >> I can't say I've digested all of this yet, but what SELinux testing >> have you done with this patchset? > > Using the fsopen()/fsmount() syscalls, these hooks will be made use of, say > for NFS (which I haven't included in this list). Even sys_mount() will make > use of them a bit, so just booting the system does that. > > Note that for SELinux these hooks don't change very much except how the > parameters are handled. It doesn't actually change the checks that are made - > at least, not yet. There are some additional syscalls under consideration > (such as the ability to pick a live mounted filesystem into a context) that > might require additional permits. Neither fsopen() nor fscontext_fs_write() appear to perform any kind of up-front permission checking (DAC or MAC), although some security hooks may be ultimately called to allocate structures, parse security options, etc. Is there a reason not apply a may_mount() or similar check up front?
