On 2018-03-28 12:39, Jonathan Corbet wrote:
> On Fri, 16 Mar 2018 05:00:28 -0400
> Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container ID of a process,
> > emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER record to document the event.
>
> A little detail, but still...
I am understanding that you would prefer more context (as opposed to
operational detail) in the description, laying out the use case for this
patch(set)?
> > +static int audit_set_containerid_perm(struct task_struct *task, u64 containerid)
> > +{
> > + struct task_struct *parent;
> > + u64 pcontainerid, ccontainerid;
> > +
> > + /* Don't allow to set our own containerid */
> > + if (current == task)
> > + return -EPERM;
> > + /* Don't allow the containerid to be unset */
> > + if (!cid_valid(containerid))
> > + return -EINVAL;
>
> I went looking for cid_valid(), but it turns out you don't add it until
> patch 5. That, I expect, will not be good for bisectability (or patch
> review).
Nice catch, thanks Jon. That is very likely another victim of a git
rebase to re-order afterthoughts in the right place. I'll need to be
more careful of that class of bug, rethink my workflow, or script builds
to verify each commit is compilable.
> Thanks,
>
> jon
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
