FUSE can be mounted by unprivileged users either today with fusermount
installed with setuid, or soon with the upcoming patches to allow FUSE
mounts in a non-init user namespace.
This patch addresses the new unprivileged non-init mounted filesystems,
which are untrusted, by failing the signature verification.
This patch defines two new flags SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE and
SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
Changelog v2:
- Limit patch to non-init mounted filesystems.
- Define 2 sb->s_iflags
Changelog v1:
- Merged the unprivileged and privileged patches.
- Dropped IMA fsname support.
- Introduced a new IMA builtin policy named "untrusted_fs".
- Replaced fs_type flag with sb->s_iflags flag.
---
include/linux/fs.h | 2 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 2a815560fda0..4e1c76af7b68 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1320,6 +1320,8 @@ extern int send_sigurg(struct fown_struct *fown);
/* sb->s_iflags to limit user namespace mounts */
#define SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE 0x00000010 /* fstype already mounted */
+#define SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE 0x00000020
+#define SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER 0x00000040
/* Possible states of 'frozen' field */
enum {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 1b177461f20e..f34901069e78 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -302,7 +302,18 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
}
out:
- if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
+ /*
+ * File signatures on some filesystems can not be properly verified.
+ * On these filesytems, that are mounted by an untrusted mounter,
+ * fail the file signature verification.
+ */
+ if (inode->i_sb->s_iflags &
+ (SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE | SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER)) {
+ status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ cause = "unverifiable-signature";
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
+ op, cause, rc, 0);
+ } else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
(!xattr_value ||
xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
@@ -319,6 +330,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
} else {
ima_cache_flags(iint, func);
}
+
ima_set_cache_status(iint, func, status);
return status;
}
--
2.7.5
