On Wed, 2018-02-14 at 08:49 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx): > > Files on untrusted filesystems, such as fuse, can change at any time, > > making the measurement(s) and by extension signature verification > > meaningless. > > > > FUSE can be mounted by unprivileged users either today with fusermount > > installed with setuid, or soon with the upcoming patches to allow FUSE > > mounts in a non-init user namespace. > > > > This patch always fails the file signature verification on unprivileged > > and untrusted filesystems. To also fail file signature verification on > > Why only untrusted? Fuse could cause the same issue if it just > messes up when mounted from init userns right? Right, whether it is an unprivileged mount or not, fuse can return whatever it wants, whenever it wants. IMA can calculate the file hash based based on what it reads, but fuse can return whatever it wants on subsequent reads. Refer to the discussion with Linus - http://kernsec.org/pipermail/linu x-security-module-archive/2018-February/005200.html > > privileged, untrusted filesystems requires a custom policy. > > (I'm not saying you shouldn't do this, but) does this mean that > a container whose rootfs is fuse-mounted by the unprivileged user > cannot possibly use IMA? How would you suggest to differentiate between your unprivileged fuse mounts from unintended, unintended malicious ones? The remaining patches are policy based. > Good thing we can partially work around that by intercepting real > mount calls with Tycho's new patchset :) Can you provide a little more details? thanks, Mimi > > > (This patch is based on Alban Crequy's use of fs_flags and patch > > description.) > > > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@xxxxxxxxxx> > > Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > > include/linux/fs.h | 1 + > > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 +++++++++- > > 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h > > index 2a815560fda0..faffe4aab43d 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/fs.h > > +++ b/include/linux/fs.h > > @@ -2069,6 +2069,7 @@ struct file_system_type { > > #define FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA 2 > > #define FS_HAS_SUBTYPE 4 > > #define FS_USERNS_MOUNT 8 /* Can be mounted by userns root */ > > +#define FS_UNTRUSTED 16 /* Defined filesystem as untrusted */ > > #define FS_RENAME_DOES_D_MOVE 32768 /* FS will handle d_move() during rename() internally. */ > > struct dentry *(*mount) (struct file_system_type *, int, > > const char *, void *); > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > > index f2803a40ff82..af8add31fe26 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > > @@ -292,7 +292,14 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, > > } > > > > out: > > - if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) { > > + /* Fail untrusted and unpriviliged filesystems (eg FUSE) */ > > + if ((inode->i_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_UNTRUSTED) && > > + (inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)) { > > + status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; > > + cause = "untrusted-filesystem"; > > + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, > > + op, cause, rc, 0); > > + } else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) { > > if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) && > > (!xattr_value || > > xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) { > > @@ -309,6 +316,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, > > } else { > > ima_cache_flags(iint, func); > > } > > + > > ima_set_cache_status(iint, func, status); > > return status; > > } > > -- > > 2.7.5 >
